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The jury system seems to show a desire for punitive [action] and
retribution above and beyond the degree of injury---"let's get the
rich doctor."'
In real life, any theory will do as long as it gets the case to the
jury, whose natural sympathies will usually produce a large judg-
ment without much concern for the legal technicalities.'
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1. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CASE STUDY IN
NORTH CAROLINA 20 (1986) [hereinafter N.C. CASE STUDY] (alteration in original).
2. T.R.B., The Tort Explosion, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 18, 1985, at 4. The article
further stated that "high settlements lead to skyrocketing insurance rates. And soon so
much cost is being absorbed that the activity in question, be it practicing gynecology or
manufacturing a vaccine or being on the city council, is no longer economically practica-
ble." Id.
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[J]urors have become accustomed to huge award requests, and
they are more willing to reach into the deep pockets of mal-
practice insurers to compensate the victims generously-more
willing than when they encounter the victims of automobile acci-
dents, for in these cases the insurance premiums at risk are paid
directly by jurors themselves.3
INTRODUCTION
The role of the jury in medical negligence cases ranks among
the most contentious issues in contemporary debate about the
merits of the tort system.4 As the above quotations demonstrate, a
common complaint from all sides of the political spectrum is that
jurors are biased against doctors and hospitals because they be-
lieve that someone ought to pay when a serious medical injury oc-
curs and that doctors and hospitals have the "deep pockets" to
provide the compensation. In this Article, I first review these
claims and critique the prior empirical research alleged to support
them. I then describe a controlled experiment that tested the hy-
pothesis that jurors are prone to award excessive amounts for pain
and suffering when the defendants are doctors or hospitals. Nei-
ther the prior research nor the experiment's results support the
deep pockets hypothesis. The final Parts of the Article discuss
these findings in the context of other research as well as the de-
bate about medical negligence and the tort system.
I. THE CLAIMS AND THE EVIDENCE: A CRITIQUE
A. The Claims
The three prefatory assertions about juries do not stand alone.
Physicians, liability insurers, and commentators critical of the
American tort system frequently raise the argument that juries are
biased against doctors and hospitals. In a 1988 proposal advocating
3. PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 48 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process,
1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 201 [hereinafter Galanter, The Civil Jury]; Marc Galanter, Read-
ing the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); Mi-
chael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147 (1992); Neil Vidmar, The Unfair Criti-
cism of Medical Malpractice Juries, 76 JUDICATURE 118 (1992).
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a fault-based administrative system for medical malpractice as an
alternative to the tort system, the American Medical Association
(AMA) declared,
In the medical liability context, a source of at least some of the
problem [sic] for physicians and other health care providers with
the existing system appears to many to be the jury .... [Prob-
lems with the jury] include decisions that are not based on a
thorough understanding of medical facts and awards that increase
at an alarming rate and in a fashion that seems uniquely to dis-
advantage physicians as compared with other individuals who are
found to have acted negligently ....
What makes the damage awards in professional liability
lawsuits particularly disconcerting is the fact that identical injuries
will command much higher recoveries in malpractice cases than
in other tort suits, such as automobile accidents.'
The North Carolina Hospital Association claimed,
Often awards have little relationship to the seriousness of the
injury. There is no way to predict how a jury will rule on a par-
ticular set of facts. Often awards bear no relationship 
to econom-
ic losses .... Today, juries often make awards regardless of the
"fault" of anyone-out of sympathy for an injured person. More
and more the public attitude is that insurance will compensate
the injured party and the defendant will not sustain any
loss .... Too often, juries appear to award on [the] basis of
emotion as opposed to facts and/or realistic evaluation of case
circumstances.6
In its annual report to Congress in 1991, the Physician Payment
Review Commission stated,
Malpractice injuries seem to be compensated more than are com-
parable injuries arising from nonmedical settings. For example,
researchers estimated that median awards for a leg amputation
were $199,999 in an automobile accident case, $330,000 in a pri-
vate property owner case, $687,000 in a product liability case,
5. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIALTY SoCIErY MEDICAL LiABILITy
PROJECT, A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE CIvIL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING
MEDICAL LIABILrTY DISPUTES: A FAULT-BASED, ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 7-8, 9-10
(1988) [hereinafter, AMA PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE REPORT]. This report was rewritten
to appear as a law review article. See Kirk Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative
Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365 (1989).
6. N.C. CASE STUDY, supra note 1, at 21-22.
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$754,000 in a medical malpractice case against a physician, and
$761,000 in a Workmen's compensation case. The disparities may
be due to jurors' knowledge that physicians are heavily insured
or that the claimant's legal fees must be taken out of the judg-
ment. This does not indicate which is the appropriate level of
compensation, only that payments are inconsistent across con-
texts.7
In a twenty-minute videotape produced in 1992 by The Manhattan
Institute for Policy Research, C. Everett Koop, former Surgeon
General of the United States, relates a hypothetical situation in
which a child is born with cerebral palsy. Although the doctor has
no control over the condition, the family seeks to blame him. Dr.
Koop goes on to say that "if they attempt to sue their physician
they're very likely to find a sympathetic jury that will award some-
thing to that family not necessarily because they think the doctor
is guilty of negligence or malpractice but because their sympathy
for the family dictates it."8
Claims about the deep pockets effect also extend to products
liability, government defendants, and other types of cases in which
critics assert that jury sympathies lie with injured parties and
against defendants who have the ability to pay large sums. In
Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences, popular
writer and critic of the tort liability system, Peter Huber, wrote of
legal outcomes in the 1970s and 1980s that "judges and juries
were, for the most part, committed to running a generous sort of
charity. If the new tort system cannot find a careless defendant
after an accident, it will often settle for a merely wealthy one."'
Huber also offered an explanation: "The only human reaction to
the individual tragedy, viewed close up, is unbounded generosity,
which any large corporation or insurer can surely afford to under-
7. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CON-
GRESS-(1991) (citing PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 53-56 (1985)). Danzon
reported data from Cook County, Illinois compiled in Rand Corporation reports authored
by Mark Peterson, George Priest, and Michael G. Shanley. See MARK A. PETERSON &
GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE RAND CORPORATION, THE CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS
AND VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960-1979 (1982); MICHAEL G. SHANLEY &
MARK A. PETERSON, THE RAND CORPORATION, COMPARATIVE JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY
VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTY, 1959-1980, (1983). I will address and
critique these studies in Section I(B).
8. LIABILITY: INJUSTICE FOR ALL (Manhattan Institute for Policy Research 1992).




write."'" Judicial opinions, law reviews, and scientific journals ex-
press similar opinions."
In the context of medical malpractice, four overlapping empir-
ical assertions have been made: (1) juries give larger awards in
malpractice cases than in other types of cases, particularly automo-
bile negligence cases, even when injuries are objectively simi-
lar-the deep pockets hypothesis; (2) the rates of plaintiff victories
in malpractice cases have increased in recent years; (3) the sizes of
awards have increased; and (4) the awards for non-economic dam-
ages such as pain and suffering in particular are out of control.
With respect to this last assertion, Weiler writes, "[T]he most
troublesome feature of large tort verdicts is the amount of damag-
es awarded for pain and suffering, not for direct medical costs."'
The AMA Proposed Alternative Report, drawing on a study by
Patricia Danzon, asserted that "for larger claims ... non-economic
injury is often the largest component of the award."'3 The 1992
Annual Report to Congress of the Physician Payment Review
Commission states,
10. Id. at 185.
11. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1265 (Ill. 1977) (Ryon,
J., dissenting) (arguing that "sympathetic juries and an increasingly efficient plaintiff's bar
have managed to inflate the size of verdicts" and commenting on the "deep pockets"
phenomenon); Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudica-
tive Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1808 (1986); Dorsey D. Ellis, Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 975 (1989); Kirk B. Johnson, Beyond Tort Reform, 257 JAMA 827 (1987); Richard
E. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for Judicial
Deference to Medical Malpractice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1483 (1989); Richard J.
Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Triak Punitive Damages Versus New
Products, 246 SCIENCE 1395 (1989). Clark Havighurst asserts,
Although it is customary in our adversary system to regard a jury trial as a
"black box" the outcomes of which (on nonlegal questions) are granted a pow-
erful presumption of legitimacy, realism compels recognition that juries are often
poorly positioned to choose reliably between the well argued, but often highly
confusing, theories of the two sides' experts. As a result, they often fall back
on such irrelevancies as the witnesses' demeanor and style of presentation or
sympathy for the plaintiffs' plight or the defendants' reputation.
CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 778 (1988).
12. WEILER, supra note 3, at 54.
13. AMA PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE REPORT, supra note 5, at 9 (citing DANzON,
supra note 7). See also Johnson et al., supra note 5, at 1369 ("Because large portions of
the awards depend upon subjective and emotional considerations, some injured patients
recover nothing, some receive less than fair compensation, and others recover amounts
far in excess of their losses, both economic and noneconomic.") (footnotes omitted). For
a discussion of Danzon's research, see infra subsection I(C)(3).
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Much of the unpredictability and inconsistency of malpractice
awards is due to non-economic damages (i.e., pain and suffering),
which constitute about half of total payments .... Such damages
are highly subjective. Reducing this unpredictability and removing
the open-ended nature of these damages would probably improve
decisionmaking during the course of a lawsuit. 4
The evidentiary base for the AMA's and Weiler's conclusion
that the problem of awards for pain and suffering is particularly
acute is rather scanty. The assertion is apparently derived from a
study by Danzon.' 5 Danzon's study combined databases from sev-
eral sources and attempted to estimate the components of awards
that can be ascribed to pain and suffering. 6 It is important to
note, however, that Weiler's claim, citing Danzon, that "damages
for pain and suffering, broadly defined, now make up nearly 50
percent of total tort damages paid for medical cases, with the
largest awards taking the lion's share of this money," cannot be
found in the Danzon study. 7 Similarly, the AMA Proposed Al-
ternative Report's claim that Danzon's study found that "the pain
14. PHYsIcIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 201
(1992) (citation omitted). In Medical Economics, James D. Griffith, an attorney specializ-
ing in the defense of malpractice cases, argued that "there's no limit on what jurors can
award for pain and suffering so too often they act like Santa Claus, handing out millions,
of dollars in cases involving comparably minor injuries." James D. Griffith, What Will It
Take to Resolve the Malpractice Crisis, MEDICAL ECON., Sept. 27, 1982, at 195. In 1991,
the centerpiece of President Bush's draft proposal on health care was a proposal to limit
the amounts that malpractice victims can collect for pain and suffering. Philip J. Hilts,
Bush Enters Malpractice Debate with Plan to Limit Court Awards, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
1991, at Al.
15. Patricia Danzon, Report on Awards for Noneconomic Loss, in FLORIDA MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE POLICY GUIDEBOOK 132 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1985).
16. See infra subsection I(C)(3).
17. Weiler, supra note 3, at 55 (citing Danzon, supra note 15, at 128-42); see id. at
55 n.36. Weiler's other sources were a study by Viscusi that attempted to eliminate pain
and suffering awards in products liability cases, id. at 55 (applying W. Kip Viscusi, Pain
and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or Capricious Awards?,
8 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 203, 205-19 (1988)), and an unsupported allusion to the
"[w]idespread sentiment that pain and suffering awards were out of control [that] inspired
many states in the eighties to establish caps solely on this type of damages," id.
Weiler evidently determined that awards for non-economic damages were too high
because state legislatures acted on the belief that they were too high. This is a dangerous
predicate for empirical assumptions because legislative tort reform efforts are frequently
based on erroneous assertions. See, eg., NEIL VIDMAR FT AL, AN EMPIRIcAL EXAMINA-
TION OF A LEGISLATED PROCEDURAL REFORM: COURT-BASED MANAGEMENT OF MEDI-
CAL MALPRACrICE LITIGATION 84-88 (1992) (discussing North Carolina reforms); Joseph
Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races". The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform
Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207, 276-80 (1990) (discussing Texas reforms).
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and suffering portion of [awards in excess of $100,000] accounts
for 80 percent of the total verdict in such cases"'" also cannot be
found in that source.' Danzon did conclude that of those plain-
tiffs who won a verdict in large damage award cases, 51% received
a pain and suffering award in excess of $100,000.20 Even these
figures, however, must be interpreted in relation to the total
amount of the awards. In a subsequent interpretation of her
study's findings, Danzon stated that "[p]ayments in excess of
$100,000 for pain and suffering on malpractice cases increased
from 1.8 percent to 12.8 percent of total payments to plaintiffs on
all tort cases."'" There are some very- serious problems of inter-
pretation and communication in the Danzon report, as I will dem-
onstrate below,' but it is clear that neither the 50% nor the 80%
estimates for pain and suffering were made by Danzon. In the way
I was taught mathematics 12.8% cannot easily be rounded to
"nearly 50%," let alone to "80%."
The deep pockets hypothesis rests on three interrelated psy-
chological assumptions about medical negligence costs. Unreason-
able awards are purported to result from: (1) jurors' tendency in
medical negligence cases to focus on plaintiff needs rather than
liability; (2) jurors' belief in health provider defendants' capacity to
pay; and (3) jurors' failure to perceive a connection between an
award and its potential effect on their own lives or on society.
Weiler claims that in contrast to jurors in medical negligence cases,
jurors in automobile accident cases consider the impact of large
awards on their own lives because "the insurance premiums at risk
are paid directly by the jurors themselves."'  Huber expounds a
parallel thesis: "The layperson votes in favor of expansive liability
[out of compassion] when sitting in the jury box but votes over-
whelmingly in favor of limiting liability when the legal rules are
put to public referendum."'24
18. AMA PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
19. Id. (citing Danzon, supra note 15). This claim was not included in the Johnson
article which was based on the AMA report. See Johnson et al., supra note 5.
20. Danzon, supra note 15, at 133.
21. Patricia M. Danzon, The "Crisis" in Medical Malpractice: A Comparison of
Trends in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia, 18 LAW, MED.
& HEALTH CARE 48, 49 (1990).
22. See infra subsection I(C)(3).
23. WEmER, supra note 3, at 48.
24. HuBER supra note 9, at 186; see also Frederick D. Watkins, Social Inflation: Our
Next Trial, 77 INSURANCE MAG. 42, 44-45 (1976) (arguing that juries routinely perceive
1993]
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It is worth observing that assertions that sympathy for plain-
tiffs drives jurors' decisions date back at least 140 years. Indeed,
Judge Barculo's opinion in Haring v. New-York and Erie Railroad
Co.' has a very contemporary ring:
We can not shut our eyes to the fact that in certain controversies
between the weak and the strong-between a humble individual
and a gigantic corporation, the sympathies of the human mind
naturally, honestly and generously, run to the assistance and
support of the feeble, and apparently oppressed; and that com-
passion will sometimes exercise over the deliberations of a jury,
an influence which, however honorable to them as philanthro-
pists, is wholly inconsistent with the principles of law and the
ends of justice.H
B. The Evidence
Although the deep pockets hypothesis is an integral part of
American legal folklore, examination of the text and footnotes of
the writings of contemporary jury critics indicates that recent
claims about the deep pockets hypothesis emanate from several
empirical studies. Audrey Chin and Mark Peterson, two research-
ers with the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice, com-
pared the outcomes of over 1000 civil trials that took place in
Cook County, Illinois between 1959 and 1979.z The data were
derived from verdict reporters, comprehensive accounts of all
trials within the county that provide basic data about the case,
corporate defendants as being better able to "foot the bill" for injuries than plaintiffs).
25. 13 Barb. 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1852). This case and related history are reviewed in
Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44
HASTINGS LJ. 579 (1993).
26. Haring, 13 Barb. at 15-16.
27. See AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, THE RAND CORPORATION, DEEP
POcKETs, EMPrY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985). The
Chin and Peterson study builds upon two earlier reports. See PETERSON & PRIEST, supra
note 7; MARK A. PETERSON, THE RAND CORPORATION, COMPENSATION OF INJURIES:
CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY (1984).
28. Verdict reporters are compilations of jury verdicts and other data bearing on jury
outcomes in specific jurisdictions. They are primarily subscription services for lawyers,
judges, insurance companies, businesses, and local government bodies. See, e.g., CHIN &
PETRSON, supra note 27, at 63-91; Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Jury Verdicts and
the "Crisis" in Civil Justice, 11 JUST. SYS. J. 321, 328 (1986); Stephen Daniels, Civil Ju-
ries, Jury Verdict Reporters, and the Going Rate, Paper Presented at the Annual Meet-
ing of the Law & Society Association (May 29-June 1, 1986) (on file with author).
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such as the nature of the claim, the seriousness of the alleged in-
jury, and estimates of the amount of economic losses, as well as
the outcome of the trial. After controlling for severity of injury,
Chin and Peterson concluded that in cases in which the plaintiff
was not severely injured, corporate and health care provider de-
fendants paid approximately thirty percent more than other defen-
dants paid for similar injuries. When plaintiffs were severely in-
jured, however, corporate and health care provider defendants had
to pay up to more than four times the amount assessed against
individual defendants in similar cases.29 Additionally, Chin and
Peterson concluded that even when the seriousness of injury was
similar, doctors and hospitals who were defendants in ordinary
lawsuits, such as slip-and-fall cases, paid substantially less than
when they were defendants in malpractice cases.30
Working from some of the same data, James Hammitt, Ste-
phen Carroll, and Daniel Relles, three other Rand researchers,
specifically examined doctors and hospitals as defendants.3' They
concluded that "medical malpractice awards against doctors are
almost 2.5 times as great as awards against other individuals in
average case types, and awards against hospitals are 85 percent
larger.' 32 These authors offered several possible explanations for
this finding. First, jurors may balance the plaintiff's financial needs
against the financial harm to the defendant. Second, jurors may act
on their beliefs that doctors and hospitals are heavily insured or
wealthy. Third, jurors may feel that these types of harm carry a
special "insult" because of the trust a patient places in the doctor
and that larger awards are therefore appropriate.33
Two other studies have found the same pattern of data as
that found in the Hammitt, Carroll, and Relles study. In one, Ste-
phen Daniels and Joanne Martin examined over 23,000 jury ver-
dicts from forty-three counties in ten states. 4 They concluded
that awards in medical malpractice and product liability cases were
29. CHIN & PMRSON, supra note 27, at vii.
30. Id.
31. James K. Hammitt et al., Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
751 (1985).
32. Id. at 754-55.
33. Id. at 756.
34. Daniels & Martin, supra note 28, at 321; see also Stephen Daniels, Tracing the




"generally much higher than those in other legal areas. 3 5 Howev-
er, Daniels and Martin cautioned that these cases may have in-
volved more serious injuries than other types of personal injury
cases.31 They also questioned the representativeness of the data
Chin and Peterson used 37 and concluded that there is "little sys-
tematic evidence concerning actual jury verdicts., 31 In the other
study, Randall Bovbjerg, Frank Sloan, Avi Dor, and Chee Ruey
Hsieh analyzed verdicts from the Rand database together with
verdicts from five other jurisdictions to determine whether mal-
practice cases yield different verdicts than cases involving automo-
bile injuries, product liability, or government defendants. 9 Using
multiple regression analysis to statistically control for a number of
variables (such as injury severity), they concluded that the expect-
ed value of malpractice verdicts was larger than for other types of
cases, particularly automobile injuries. In a subsample of cases in
which the injuries resulted in death, the amount of the awards for
malpractice cases was, on average, more than twice the amount for
injuries resulting from automobile accidents.' The researchers
suggested, however, that much of the difference may be due to the
fact that the malpractice and auto injury cases that actually make
it to trial have different kinds of plaintiffs; malpractice attorneys
specifically select for trial cases in which plaintiffs appeal to jurors'
sympathies.4 According to this explanation, it may not be deep
pockets, but rather case selection, that causes the observed differ-
ence.4 2
In another Rand study, Mark Peterson compared jury verdicts
in Cook County, Illinois and San Francisco County, California
from 1960 to 1984.' 3 In both jurisdictions, the probability of
35. Id, at 339.
36. Id. at 343.
37. Id. at 326-27.
38. Id. at 325.
39. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other Person-
al Injuries Created Equal? 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 5. The five
other jurisdictions were Kansas City, Missouri, Kansas City, Kansas, San Francisco and
several other counties in California, and Cook County, Illinois. Id. app. 1.
40. See id, at 31.
41. Id. at 35-36.
42. Id. The selection hypothesis will be considered in more detail in subsection
I(C)(1).
43. MARK A. PETERSON, THE RAND CORPORATION, CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980S:




plaintiff verdicts in medical negligence trials increased from about
one chance in four to one chance in two." The amounts awarded
to prevailing plaintiffs also increased dramatically; in Cook County,
for example, the median award more than tripled.45
C. Problems with the Evidence
Taken at face value, the above studies appear to support the
notion of a deep pockets effect. Examined more closely, however,
none can support the conclusions that have been drawn from
them, and for a very compelling reason: they are methodologically
flawed to the point that very plausible alternative explanations of
the data cannot be discarded. Moreover, on the issue of liability,
the data appear contrary to the deep pockets hypothesis; so do
some of the data regarding amounts awarded as damages. Finally,
there are no data at all to support the contentions that jurors are
psychologically motivated by uncontrolled sympathy for plaintiffs
and a belief that the rich ought to pay.
1. The Case Selection Problem. The databases for the em-
pirical studies on which proponents of the deep pockets hypothesis
rely are limited to cases that went to trial. They provide no infor-
mation about the lawsuits that were settled, dropped, or disposed
of through judicial rulings. Sources tell us that depending on the
type of case, only 2 to 12% of lawsuits culminate in a jury trial. 4
Moreover, the numbers and types of cases that proceed to trial
vary over time and between jurisdictions.47 The thrust of this in-
sight is that different mixes of cases in each category may reach
44. Id. at 17.
45. Id. at 22. Between 1960 and 1964, the median award was $35,000. Between 1980
and 1984 it was $121,000. Differences in the mean or average amounts, which are inflat-
ed by extreme amounts, were even more dramatic: from $52,000 in 1960-1964 to
$1,179,000 in 1980-1984. The findings for San Francisco were similar. See A. Russell
Localio, Variations on $962,258: The Misuse of Data on Medical Malpractice, 13 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 126 (1985) (discussing issues relating to the interpretation of
means and medians).
46. See, eg., Saks, supra note 4, at 1212-13, 1226 (reporting that 10% of medical
malpractice cases proceed to trial).
47. For an extensive discussion of this matter, see Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the
Selection Effec" A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
337 (1990); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement




trial; juries may be deciding very different proportions and types
of cases, rather than deciding similar cases differently.4"
Since this elementary fact seems to have escaped some experi-
enced researchers and was conveniently forgotten by others,49 an
elementary example is not out of order. Assume that in a particu-
lar jurisdiction, the only cases that go before juries are ones in
which defendants are found liable and that the only task of the
jury is to decide damages. Assume further that at Year 1, two
types of cases are selected for jury trial: Type A cases are worth
$10,000, and Type B cases are worth $100,000. During Year 1, ten
Type A cases and ten Type B cases are tried. The juries are reli-
able, so that on average, Type A plaintiffs each receive $10,000,
and Type B plaintiffs each receive $100,000. If we calculate the
average jury award for the year, it is: ((10 trials x $10,000) + (10
trials x $100,000)) + 20 trials = $55,000. Assume now that between
Year 1 and Year 5, the state introduces an alternative dispute
resolution program for cases worth $10,000 or less and that it is so
successful that all Type A cases are settled in Year 5. Only Type
B cases are left, of which there are still 10 per year, to go to trial.
Each type B case still receives $100,000. The average award at
Year 5 is: (10 trials x $100,000) + 10 = $100,000. Thus, the average
jury award has increased $45,000 (from $55,000 to $100,000), or
82%, between Year 1 and Year 5. Can we conclude that juries
have become more magnanimous over the five-year period? Of
course not; the change in the types of cases going to trial caused
the change in the average award. Similarly, we would not be justi-
fied in concluding that juries had become less generous if, for
some reason, Type B cases settled and only Type A cases went to
48. See Neil Vidmar, Making Inferences About Jury Behavior From Jury Verdict
Statistics: Cautions About the Lorelei's Lied (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); see also Saks, supra note 4, at 1244. Saks points out that complications go be-
yond cases that are filed. Different types of cases may have different rates of injury
incidence, numbers of claims arising out of incidents, and pre-litigation settlement rates.
This fact further complicates attempts to compare jury verdicts across different types of
cases. Id.
49. See, eg., Hammitt et al., supra note 31. Interestingly, although the other Rand
researchers consistently recognized the selection problem at various places in their re-
ports, they continued to make conclusions that the changes in win ratios and awards over
time constituted or implied changes in jury behavior. For instance, Peterson stated that
"there may have been differences over time or across jurisdictions," PETERSON, supra
note 43, at xii, but stated that the data showed that "plaintiffs are increasingly advan-
taged in jury trials," id. at ix, and "Cook County jury verdicts were increasingly favorable
to plaintiffs ... " id. at vii.
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trial." Without knowing about the base of cases from which trials
were selected and about any changes in that base, we can con-
clude nothing about changes in jury behavior from verdict reports.
The jury verdict data in the Rand studies do not provide
direct information on changes in case selection, but they do
strongly suggest that such factors may have been operating. For
example, in San Francisco, the annual number of malpractice jury
trials decreased by almost half between the 1960-1964 period and
the 1980-1984 period, from 95 trials to 55.1 Unless one assumes
that the number of malpractice suits also declined by half-a most
unlikely hypothesis-we must infer that cases were being settled
differently. In fact, the Rand report notes that in California a
vigorous alternative dispute resolution program was instituted in
the courts in the 1980s. 2 It is highly probable, therefore, that in
1984, juries were deciding a different mix of cases than in 1960.
The case selection problem also plagues attempts to compare
jury verdicts across jurisdictions because of possible differences in
"legal cultures." For example, although Peterson's data show that
the number of malpractice cases going to trial in San Francisco
between 1960 and 1984 was almost halved, the number of cases in
Cook County, Illinois almost tripled. Peterson recognized this
50. we can push the example still further in any number of ways. Suppose that
between Years 1 and 5, more Type B cases were filed and went to trial so that at Year
5, juries were deciding ten Type A cases and twenty Type B cases. In this instance, the
average award would be $70,000. Alternatively, consider an example in which only half
of the Type A cases are diverted to alternative dispute resolution. We also can vary the
example using liability, rather than damages, e.g., defendants start settling cases in which
they have a low chance of prevailing at trial. Equally important, we also can concoct
statistical scenarios in which juries actually do become more generous toward plaintiffs
(as to liability or damages, or both) between Year 1 and Year 5, but simultaneous
changes in the mix of cases going to trial yield results that reflect no change in plaintiff
win ratios or damage awards. In the most extreme example, suppose that at Year 5,
juries become really perverse and award ten Type A cases $100,000 each and ten Type
B cases only $10,000 each; despite this stunning change in behavior, the average award
would be the same as Year 1: $100,000.
51. PETERSON, supra note 43, at 11. These are the data that show plaintiff win ratios
increasing from one in four to two in four, id. at 17, and the median award increasing
from $35,000 to $121,000, id. at 22.
52. Id. at 7-9. I want to emphasize again that although Peterson clearly recognized
these and other methodological confounds throughout the report, he nevertheless was
tempted to ignore them and draw the unqualified conclusion in the executive summary
that "plaintiffs are increasingly advantaged in jury trials." Id. at ix. I want to acknowl-
edge that the hypothesis could be correct; the point, however, is that Peterson's conclu-
sion is not scientifically valid given the data he explored.
53. Id. at 11. In the 1960-1964 period, there were 56 cases. In the 1980-1984 period,
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difference and speculated that there were more Chicago lawyers
willing to try small stakes cases, and that Chicago courts might
make less aggressive use of alternative dispute resolution tech-
niques.' Despite similarities in plaintiff win ratios and award
trends in these two counties, absent information on how cases
were selected for trial, one cannot conclude that juries were be-
having the same way-or differently.
Finally, the case selection problem also confounds facile at-
tempts to compare verdicts across types of cases. There is, for
example, evidence that smaller percentages of automobile negli-
gence lawsuits go to trial than malpractice lawsuits 5 There is
also evidence that at the front end of the litigation process, mal-
practice attorneys select their cases differently than do auto negli-
gence attorneys. 6 Bovbjerg speculated that because of the costs
and risks of malpractice litigation, attorneys select cases whose
plaintiffs are likely to appeal to the sympathies of the jury. We
also know from other recent empirical studies that although the
plaintiff win rate in malpractice jury trials hovers around 30%, the
plaintiff win rate for automobile negligence trials is around 60 to
70%.58 As I have just illustrated in my example using Type A
there were 162. Id.
54. Id. at 13.
55. See Galanter, The Civil Jury, supra note 4, at 210; David B. Rottman, Tort Liti-
gation in the State Courts: Evidence from the Trial Court Information Network, ST. Cr. J.,
Fall 1990, at 4; Saks, supra note 4, at 1228; see also DANZON, supra note 7, at 56
("[L]awsuits are filed in only 20 percent of automobile claims, and only 1 percent are
litigated to verdict, whereas suits are filed in 58 percent of malpractice cases and 7 per-
cent are litigated to verdict."). Indeed, Gross and Syverud report data showing that the
percentage of auto injury cases going to trial was only 0.9% in 1988-1989, whereas other
personal injury suits proceeded to trial at a rate of 2.4%. See Gross & Syverud, supra
note 47, at 360 n.95.
56. I reached this conclusion following discussions with plaintiffs' attorneys in North
Carolina. Weiler also draws this conclusion. See WEILER, supra note 3, at 48; cf. Gross &
Syverud, supra note 47, at 349-52, 360-62.
57. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 39, at 35-36.
58. See, eg., CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 27, at 50 (reporting win rates of 53%
for auto and 33% for malpractice); PETERSON, supra note 43, at 17 (finding that in
1980-1984, the win rate in auto accidents was 70% in San Francisco and 64% in Cook
County; in contrast, the win rates in malpractice cases tried in those cities were 53% and
49%, respectively); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124, 1175 (1992) (finding that the win
rate was 60% for motor vehicle plaintiffs and 30% for medical malpractice); Henry S.
Farber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Liti-
gation Process, 22 RAND J. ECON. 199, 203 (1991) (reporting that in a sample of 326
cases against a single large hospital between 1977 and 1989, only 13, or 5.2%, were tried
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and Type B cases, the fact that these differences exist proves noth-
ing absent other data about the cases, but it still raises serious
questions about whether juries are deciding cases that are inher-
ently different because of case-selection processes.
To sum up, because jury verdict data do not provide informa-
tion about the proportions of cases selected for trial or the various
dimensions along which cases may differ as a result of different
selection processes, it is not possible to determine from such data
what changes may be occurring in jury behavior. It is not neces-
sary to specify the exact nature or extent of these confounding
variables to challenge the validity of previous authors' conclusions
about the meaning of trends over time, across jurisdictions, or
between different types of cases if they raise the possibility of
plausible alternative explanations.
2. Multiple Dimensions: The Apples and Oranges Prob-
lem. Even if the differential case selection problem did not exist,
it would still be difficult to compare verdicts in malpractice cases
with verdicts in auto injury cases and to ascribe any differences to
the deep pockets effect. The two types of cases differ on many
dimensions other than the fact that defendants in the former may
be seen as having a greater ability to pay large damage awards.
Cofisider a partial listing of the differences.
Auto injury cases typically involve a single defendant, the
driver of the automobile, but sometimes they involve multiple
plaintiffs, e.g., several persons riding in the car that was hit.59 In
contrast, malpractice cases typically involve a single plaintiff, the
injured patient, but frequently involve multiple defendants, e.g.,
two or more doctors, and perhaps the hospital, who acted as a
team in the patient's medical treatment. 60 Many, perhaps most,
auto injuries arise between persons with no prior relationship,
to verdict and all were decided in the defendant's favor).
59. See eg., CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 27, at 49-56.
60. In North Carolina, the average malpractice case filed between 1984 and 1987 had
3.2 defendants. Less than one-third of the cases initially had only a single defendant; the
number of defendants ranged as high as 21. (unpublished data, on file with the author).
One reason for multiple defendants is the fact that increasingly, health care is highly spe-
cialized; a team of health care providers share responsibility for the patient's welfare.
Furthermore, a "manager" organization may be responsible for delivery of these services.
For further discussion, see TiE INsTrruTE FOR CIvIL JuSTICE, THE RAND CORPORA-
TION, HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND TORT 18-23 (Elizabeth Rolph ed., 1992) [herein-
after HEALTH CARE DELrVERY].
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whereas malpractice suits arise out of a professional and financial
relationship between patient and physician.61 Furthermore, auto
injuries typically involve a single theory of liability; malpractice
cases often involve multiple theories of causation and liability.62
In auto negligence cases, the jurors may perceive the plaintiff as
having contributed to the accident, whereas most often the medical
accident plaintiff was a passive, if not completely anesthetized,
party during the events that led to the injury.'
This last difference alone could have a major impact on ver-
dicts because most jurisdictions today apply comparative negligence
standards. It has long been thought that even in jurisdictions with
contributory negligence laws, juries frequently adjust their awards
with their own rough comparative negligence standards.' Thus, in
auto negligence cases, the jurors can almost always conceive of
ways that the plaintiff shares some responsibility for the accident,
e.g., she should have practiced better defensive driving. In contrast,
jurors would not typically perceive the medical negligence plaintiff
as having contributed to the injurious event, since she trusted the
health care providers' professional judgments and skills.' In
short, discounting under comparative negligence standards, whether
by law or by de facto jury equity, might explain why automobile
injury awards are lower than medical negligence awards.
The trial itself also may be different. Research by Samuel
Gross and Kent Syverud indicates that a high proportion of mal-
practice cases that went to trial appeared to be contested solely on
the issue of liability, whereas this pattern was much less likely to
occur in motor vehicle suits.6 In North Carolina, malpractice de-
61. CHM & PETERSON, supra note 27, at 56; WEILER, supra note 3, at 46; Bovbjerg
et al., supra note 39, at 33 n.108.
62. See, e.g., HEALTH CARE DELIERY, supra note 60, at 17-28; CHIN & PETERSON,
supra note 27, at 49-51.
63. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 39, at 33 n.108.
64. See, e.g., Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L.
REV. 744, 756-60 (1959); Edith Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process of
Decisionmaking, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS., Autumn 1989, at 225, 229; Harry Kalven,
Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. LJ. 158,
167-68 (1958).
65. There are some exceptions to zero percent patient responsibility: cases in which
the defendants argue that the patient was told of risks of a procedure and gave informed
consent; cases in which the patient did not follow physician instructions during or after
treatment; and cases in which the illness leading to the treatment contributed to the ef-
fects of the negligent injury.
66. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 47, at 356-66. In auto injury cases, 85% of
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fense lawyers have expressed a reluctance to dispute the amount
of damages or present expert evidence on damages on the theory
that the mere mention of damages would cause the jury to assume
liability.67 This assumption may be less operative in auto injury
cases, particularly if they are taken to the jury in a dispute that is
primarily about damages. In addition, it is often asserted that
malpractice cases are litigated by attorneys who specialize in mal-
practice, whereas generalist lawyers may be more likely to litigate
auto injury cases;' specialists have become very sophisticated in
presenting day-in-the-life evidence and introducing expert evidence
on economic and non-economic damages, such as pain and suffer-
ing.
6 9
Finally, the decision rule that juries are required to apply
differs in the two types of cases. In automobile cases, as in almost
all other areas of torts, the negligence rules are based on the rea-
sonable man standard. In contrast, in medical malpractice cases,
the rule is whether the health care provider's treatment violated
professionally accepted standards of practice in his area of spe-
cialization, in that community, and during that period of time.!
To the extent that these other dimensions distinguish malprac-
tice cases from other types of cases and have an impact on jurors,
they provide additional alternative explanations for the data seem-
ing to support the deep pockets hypothesis.
plaintiffs had an offer of settlement prior to trial, but only 40% of malpractice plaintiffs
had similar offers. Id. at 346. My interviews with attorneys suggest that this result is also
likely to be found in North Carolina, but, unlike the malpractice cases, I have no system-
atic data on auto negligence cases.
67. This conclusion was derived from interviews with both plaintiff and defense mal-
practice attorneys in North Carolina as part of a larger study of medical malpractice
litigation. See Vidmar, supra note 4, at 124; VrDmAR ET AL., supra note 17. My conclu-
sions from the interview data were supported by a survey of 25 cases filed in North
Carolina that went to trial between July 1987 and December 1989. In 16 cases, the plain-
tiff called expert testimony on damages and the defense called no evidence; in five cases,
both plaintiff and defendant had expert evidence on damages; in four cases, neither side
called experts on the issue of damages. This difference is statistically significant. A Chi-
square test yields a value of 10.68, which is significant at the .01 level of confidence.
68. WEILER, supra note 3, at 48.
69. Id. For a general discussion of day-in-the-life evidence, see, for example, J. Ric
Gass, Defending Against Day-in-the-Life Videos, 34 FOR DEF., July 1992, at 8.
70. See WEILER, supra note 3, at 19-26; Robert C. Clark, Why Does Health Care
Regulation Fail?, 41 MD. L. REv. 1, 5-8 (1981); Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wild-
er, Medical Standard Setting in the Current Malpractice Environment Problems and Pos-
sibilities, 22 U.C. DAvIs L. Rnv. 421, 440-42 (1989).
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3. Tenuous Findings About Non-Economic Damag-
es. Danzon's study on non-economic damages,7' which the
AMA72 and Weiler7 3 cited to support their claims that jurors are
overly generous with pain and suffering awards, and which Danzon
cited in a subsequent article claiming that the percentage of pain
and suffering awards is growing,74 has methodological problems
that most social scientists would consider grave. Danzon's primary
data were based on Florida malpractice claims closed in 1984. Of a
projected total of 322 cases that went to jury trial, some of the
cases may have been tried to the judge or dismissed by the
court.75 From this contaminated sample, Danzon estimated that
84 cases resulted in a plaintiff verdict but conceded that "the pre-
cise number could be as low as 45 or as high at [sic] 132. ",76 She
conceded that these data were subject to "great sampling variabili-
ty"77 and were discrepant from other, more comprehensive data
showing substantially lower plaintiff win rates in Florida. She then
went on to estimate from this unreliable sample that of plaintiffs
71. See Danzon, supra note 15.
72. AMA PROPOSED ALTERNATWVE REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
73. WEILER, supra note 3, at 55 n.36.
74. Danzon, supra note 21, at 49.
75. Danzon supra note 15, at 132. Danzon arrives at this estimate of the number of
1984 cases by projecting from 1983 claims in Florida and the 1980 National Association
of Insurance Commissioners report, cf. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMIS-
SIONERS, MALPRACrIE CLAIMS (M. Patricia Sowka ed., 1980). In using this latter study,
Danzon implicitly assumed that the trial rate in Florida was the same as nationwide
averages and, further her study is contaminated by cases that might have been settled at
trial, decided in a bench trial, or by some other disposition. Danzon's description of how
the figure of 322 potential jury cases was arrived at is as follows:
A total of 2,539 malpractice claims were closed in Florida 1983. Since
unpublished St. Paul data show no increase in frequency in 1984, the same
number is used for 1984 claims. On average, 87.3 percent of malpractice claims
are dropped or settled out of court; the remaining 12.7 percent of claims go to
trial and are resolved either by final judgment by jury or judge, by dismissal,
or by other disposition. These numbers imply a total of 322 court dispositions
in Florida in 1984.
Danzon supra note 15, at 132 (citations omitted). In an article published in 1986, Danzon
observed that other data showed "significant differences in claim frequency for 1983, by
type of insurer." Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice
Claims: New Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 57, 61 n.15. Dpnzon
continued to cite results from the Florida study in her 1990 article accompanied by a
footnote indicating some of the sources of possible error in generalizing from her data,
but she did not address the confounds that are discussed in this Article. See Danzon,
supra note 21, at 49 & n.9.
76. Danzon, supra note 15, at 132.
77. Id.
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who won a verdict, 51% received a pain and suffering award in
excess of $100,000. However, she conceded that the figure could
easily be "as low as 23 or as high as 67. "78 In fact, the 51% fig-
ure was not based on Florida data, but rather on estimates from
the Cook County, Illinois data in the Rand studies.79 Danzon
merged these data sets, concluding that "[t]he Cook County expe-
rience is therefore reasonably representative for Florida as a
whole."'  She also included decade-old data from a nationwide
survey of closed claims that included settled cases as well as jury
verdicts,81 which Danzon conceded was not representative of mal-
practice cases. After merging these data sets, she concluded that
the "data imply that 2.7 percent of all claims or 5.6 percent of
paid claims receive compensation for pain and suffering in excess
of $100,000." The report continued with more acknowledge-
ments of bias in the data and concessions of "best estimate[s],"
but regardless of these major deficiencies, Danzon asserted that
her conclusions were "not implausible."' Although much more
could be said about the flaws in the Danzon study, this incomplete
recitation is sufficient to show that its method and conclusions are,
to say the least, seriously compromised.'
78. Id. at 133.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 134.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 136. These "not implausible" conclusions were repealed in a subsequent ar-
ticle by Danzon with some qualifications in a footnote. See Danzon, supra note 21, at 49
& n.9.
84. Nevertheless, at least a lengthy footnote should call attention to another matter.
I am concerned about the databases used to estimate non-economic damages and the
meaning that should be ascribed to the estimates. The concern applies not only to the
Danzon study in question but to other researchers' attempts to calculate non-economic
damages, particularly pain and suffering, from verdict reporters and closed-claim files. For
a more extensive discussion of the problems with verdict reporter data, see Vidmar,
supra note 48; see also PETERSON, supra note 27, at 8-9 (researchers estimated disabili-
ties from plaintiffs' injuries); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 39; Frank A. Sloan & Chee R.
Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 997 (1990); Viscusi supra note 17. To calculate non-economic damages, the
known special damages are subtracted from the total verdict (less punitive damages, if
any); the residual is the figure used for non-economic damages. Usually researchers label
the residual simply "pain and suffering."
There are several major reasons to be concerned about the use of these figures.
First, the databases are often missing extensive information. In Medical Malpractice,
Danzon used closed-claims insurance files. She stated that these data "only report the
insurance company's estimate of economic loss" and concluded that "the data on earnings
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were particularly poor." DANZON, supra note 7, at 40. Peterson, using verdict reporters,
stated that "[o]ccasionally the Reporter included a plaintiff's income and the length of
time that his or her income was lost because of an injury," and presumably for similar
reasons, Peterson did not report information about future medical expenses or future lost
income. PETERSON, supra note 27, at 9. Viscusi similarly conceded problems with making
estimates of pain and suffering from closed-claim files.
The loss figures ... are reported losses, not actual losses. The amount of the
loss is recorded in the data set by the insurance company. To the extent that
this variable reflects the insurance company's loss estimate, the financial loss
will be understated . . . . [B]ias may also vary with the loss level. Very large
loss claims with substantial long-term medical costs may have a very wide possi-
ble variance, so that the propensity for underestimation by the insurance com-
pany and overestimation by the claimant will be especially great.
Viscusi, supra note 17, at 206; see also Sloan & Hsieh, supra, at 1012-13, 1019. The truth
of the matter is that in these data sets, economic data are frequently missing to an ex-
tensive degree. In fact, I have reviewed convenience samples of closed-claim files from
three different professional liability insurers in North Carolina. Sometimes, the financial
estimates are presented only in the most general terms; much of the time, they are
missing altogether.
The second problem is vaguely identified in the Peterson study, see PETERSON,
supra note 27, and by Viscusi, see Viscusi, supra note 17, at 206, but needs to be made
explicit. Both economic and non-economic damages have many potential components, and
there is often no bright line dividing the two. Economic damages may consist not only of
past and present medical expenses and lost wages but also future medical expenses, fu-
ture lost income, future housekeeping expenses (including modifications to homes and
automobiles), and when dependent children are involved, future costs for education. Any
observer of trials or settlement negotiations will quickly agree that the assumption that
special damages can be "easily ascertained" and "usually ... documented by routine
business records," PETERSON, supra note 27, at 9, is facile, since bitter disputes over past
lost income occur on a regular basis. Furthermore, disagreement over future income and
medical costs, reduced to present value, may exceed past economic losses by at least
several points on a Richter scale. Indeed, even experts arrive at wildly varying figures.
For instance, one case in the Duke Medical Malpractice Project study involved a severe
birth injury in which the biggest point of contention regarded future medical and associat-
ed costs. See Vidmar, supra note 4, at 122. The plaintiff's expert produced a plausible
case for an award exceeding $6 million. The defendant had obtained estimates from three
separate experts; these ranged from $2.1 million to $4.3 million. See id. What, then, was
the correct figure, and what does this example say about the ease with which economic
damages are calculated? How reliable are the accounts of economic damages in closed-
claim files and in verdict reporters, and how are they computed?
When we turn to non-economic damages, the problem becomes even more difficult.
There should be no debate that past and future pain and suffering is a non-economic
loss. Possibly, we could reach agreement that loss of consortium, nurturance for depen-
dents, and loss of enjoyment of life's amenities are also non-economic losses. Does severe
disfigurement constitute an economic or a non-economic loss? It might affect a person's
self-esteem and happiness, but it might also affect earning capacity. Is it reasonable to
label the difference between economic and total damages "pain and suffering" when it
may contain some or all of the above components?
Still further problems can be identified from discrepancies in figures contained in
published reports about unreliability of damage awards. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg et
al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV.
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4. Missing Evidence on Juror Motives. As noted above, the
claims about the deep pockets hypothesis typically involve asser-
tions about the attitudes, perceptions, and motivations that lead
jurors to malfeasance. Weiler, for example, speculated that jurors
worry about the size of awards when they perceive awards as
affecting their car insurance rates but ignore such factors in mal-
practice cases.' Koop and Huber argued that jurors ignore the
question of negligence out of sympathy for injured plaintiffs and
levy awards based on their beliefs that deep pocket defendants can
and should pay.' The Bovbjerg group speculated that in compari-
son to other tort cases, malpractice attorneys select cases that in-
volve plaintiffs who are most likely to appeal to the sympathies of
908 (1989). I compared figures for median "total awards," id. at 922, and "non-economic"
awards, id. at 937, and found: (a) that in one instance the "non-economic award" exceed-
ed the total award (median total award in cases of permanent major injury was
$1,422,000, whereas the median non-economic award in such cases was $1,642,000, or
115% of the total); and (b) that the reported median non-economic award for various
injury levels ranged between 29% and 115%, but the median non-economic award for the
total data set was reported as only 26%. Both of these findings are not logically possible.
The discrepancies may accrue in part from the fact that the cases from which the non-
economic data were taken constituted a subsample of the total sample from which the
total awards were derived, but the fact of the discrepancies itself raises serious questions
about the reliability of the estimates set forth in this study.
Finally, the above insights about the difficulty and unreliability of estimating both
economic and non-economic damages lend an alternative explanation to the conclusion of
Bovbjerg's study that the wide variation in jury awards, even within categories of injury
severity, is due primarily to the unreliability of juries. Id. at 923-26. The conclusion is
predicated on the assumptions that: (a) economic losses for different plaintiffs do not vary
greatly; (b) the parties, or outside observers, will agree as to what those losses are; and
(c) stable estimates were placed into evidence before the juries. To the extent that these
assumptions are not warranted, and the above analysis suiggests that they likely are not,
ascribing the variation in damages to jury caprice or incompetence is not valid. I do not
suggest that there is no unreliability in jury awards. The data from the experiment de-
scribed infra Part H and previous research by Neil Vidmar and Jeffrey Rice indicate
some unreliability does exist. See Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Non-
economic Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal
Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REv. 883 (1993); see also Greene, supra note 64 (finding that
the decisionmaking process of jurors depends on the complexity of the case). My point,
however, is that substantial variation also can be ascribed to prior variation in the stan-
dards by which earlier researchers have judged verdicts and that these researchers have
not given adequate recognition to the problem.
In summary, all of the published empirical studies of pain and suffering awards
should be viewed with great suspicion as to their reliability, validity, and meaning.
85. See supra text accompanying note 3.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
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the jurors, presumably leading to larger awards for medical negli-
gence.'
Verdict reporters and closed-claim files do not contain inter-
views with jurors or psychological profiles of jurors in the cases
that were decided. Similarly, neither the Rand studies nor the
Bovbjerg study presented any evidence of jurors' mindset. The
authors who have made these claims report no studies of post-trial
juror interviews.' In short, the evidence to support the claims
about juror attitudes and beliefs is pure, unsubstantiated conjec-
ture.
D. Contrary Evidence
Several findings provide evidence that appears to be contrary
to the deep pockets hypothesis. In the various Rand studies, plain-
tiff win rates never exceeded 50%; in fact, the best estimate from
the various reports was that plaintiffs prevailed on the issue of lia-
bility in less than one-third of the trials.8 9 Danzon reported that
in Florida, plaintiffs won only 13.8% of cases taken to trial;' in
another Danzon study of malpractice cases in California in 1974
and 1976, plaintiffs won only 28% of cases tried to verdict.9 In
North Carolina, the win rate was about 20o.' Other researchers
have reported figures in the vicinity of 30%. 3 In contrast, plain-
87. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 39, at 35-36. I want to be fair. Bovbjorg's group of
researchers, in contrast to the other authors, stated the matter only as a hypothesis. Id.
88. Subsequent to the publication of the above articles speculating on jury motives, a
1993 issue of The National Law Journal reported the results of a survey of 783 former
jurors with the following headline: "Many Jurors Consider Deep Pockets and Ignore
Presumption of Innocence." Although reporting that "[mi]ore than a third of all civil ju-
rors thought that members of their jury took into account the defendant's ability to pay
damages," the headline distorted the finding that "[flifty-three percent said they didn't
consider a defendant's finances" and that some of the jury experts who commented on
the survey results offered alternative explanations for the findings. Many Jurors Consider
Deep Pockets and Ignore Presumption of Innocence, NAT'L W., Feb. 22, 1993, at S12.
Moreover, the survey suffers from methodological weaknesses; the answers were retro-
"spective and the question, as reported in the article itself, asked the respondents to spec-
ulate about the minds of other jurors, rather than asking them whether they themselves
took a defendant's finances into account when reaching their verdict.
89. E.g., CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 27, at vii.
90. Danzon, supra note 15, at 132-33.
91. DANZON, supra note 7, at 38.
92. Vidmar, supra note 4, at 118, 119.
93. E.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 58, at 1162 (finding 30% plaintiff win
rates for product liability and medical malpractice trials, 60% for others); Gross &
Syverud, supra note 47, at 334 (finding 29.2% plaintiff win rate in medical malpractice
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tiff win rates for other types of tort cases, as noted earlier, are
substantially higher, sometimes approaching 70%. 4 As discussed
previously, the ways in which cases are chosen for trial substantial-
ly influence plaintiff win ratios;95 however, the consistent findings
of low win ratios in malpractice cases clearly suggest that juries do
not automatically give plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt over doc-
tors and hospitals. Otherwise, plaintiff win ratios would be much
higher.96
A recent study by Mark Taragin and his co-researchers, in-
volving over 8000 malpractice cases in New Jersey, concluded that
the probability of the plaintiff prevailing on the issue of liability at
trial was not correlated with the severity of the plaintiff's injury.'
If juror sympathy for plaintiffs were a significant factor, we should
have expected a positive correlation in which more severely in-
jured plaintiffs would win more cases.
Perhaps, however, the deep pockets effect applies only after
liability has been determined. None of the authors or organizations
making claims about the deep pockets effect has articulated a two-
stage hypothesis, but we should be willing to entertain one and
focus attention on the question of whether the deep pockets phe-
nomenon applies only to damage awards after liability has been
found.
Chin and Peterson's finding that doctors and hospitals paid
lower awards when they were found liable in non-malpractice
cases than when they were found liable in malpractice cases would
trials); see also Bovbjerg et al., supra note 39, at 22 (finding 30% plaintiff win rate in
malpractice trials). Also, although their data set included settlements as well as jury ver-
dicts, Sloan and Hsieh concluded that "[c]ontrary to the notion that payment is higher
when the defendant has deep pockets . .. cases involving hospitals as named defendants
resulted in lower rather than higher payments" compared to physician-only malpractice
cases. Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 84, at 1024.
94. See supra text accompanying note 58; see also PETERSON & PRIEST, supra note
20, at 19 (reporting that the average plaintiff win rate for medical malpractice between
1960 and 1979 was 33% and that the plaintiff win rate for auto accidents was 53%).
95. See supra subsection I(C)(1).
96. Danzon draws a similar conclusion. "The data on the issue of liability are ...
limited, but clearly refute the extreme charge that juries compensate without regard to
fault in cases of severe injury." DANZON, supra note 7, at 50.
97. Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury
on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780
(1992). Taragin also found that verdicts on liability were positively correlated with judg-
ments of negligence made by reviewing physicians acting in a neutral capacity. Id at 781.
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seem contrary to the deep pockets hypothesis." The health care
providers' perceived ability to pay should not vary by the type of
case. 9 This finding suggests that one of the other factors distin-
guishing medical and other tort negligence, discussed above, may
account for the difference.
A final piece of contrary evidence is more indirect. Danzon's
California study,10 the Rand studies,"1 and subsequent studies
comparing jury verdicts with the seriousness of plaintiffs' alleged
injuries"° have consistently concluded that the best predictor of
the size of the award is the severity of the injury.03 If the deep
pockets effect is real, these later findings suggest, it must have an
effect over and above injury severity, or at least an effect that
combines with severity in some unspecified way.
E. Conclusion: Little Evidence One Way or the Other
Influential authors and organizations have made claims about
the deep pockets hypothesis. These claims are widely disseminated
to the public, legislators and other policymakers, judges, the busi-
ness community, and the legal and scientific communities. They
play a major role in debates about the tort system. My detailed
critique, however, makes it clear that the empirical evidence sup-
porting the claim is at best flimsy, and at worst non-existent. On
the other hand, my critique does not allow the conclusion that the
deep pockets hypothesis is wrong. It simply points out that we
cannot say, one way or the other, whether it is wrong on the basis
of available data. Aggregate statistics on jury verdicts are not
capable of providing the crucial evidence because they cannot rule
98. See CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 27, at 54-56.
99. Unless, of course, jurors are aware of liability insurance coverage and assume the
limits are higher in malpractice cases than in auto injury or slip-and-fall cases, or if, as
Weiler implies, jurors distinguish between awards they perceive may affect their own in-
surance rates and those that will not while calculating damages. WEILER, supra note 3, at
48.
100. DANZON, supra note 7, at 50 ("Damage awards are strongly influenced by the
plaintiff's economic loss and by the law defining and sometimes limiting compensable
damages.").
101. CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 27; PETERSON, supra note 27.
102. E.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 84; Taragin et al., supra note 97.
103. Severity of injury accounts for about 50% of the variability in these studies,
leaving the possibility that some proportion of the remaining variability is due to the
deep pockets effect, but this possibility has yet to be demonstrated, as the present cri-




out a host of plausible alternative explanations. Clearly, then, some
other types of data are necessary to test the deep pockets hypoth-
esis. One approach is through a controlled experiment.
II. AN EXPERIMENT AND THE RESULTS
A. Overview
My students and I conducted an experiment to test the deep
pockets hypothesis without the confounding of other variables that
occurs in studies of aggregate verdict statistics. The experiment
also provided an opportunity to get a direct glimpse of the atti-
tudes and beliefs of prospective jurors. A sample of 147 veniremen
was asked to award damages for pain and suffering in a case in-
volving a young woman who suffered a broken leg and resultant
complications. For some jurors, negligence was ascribed to health
care providers: either one doctor, two doctors, or a hospital. For
other jurors, the cause was ascribed to negligence involving the
operation of a motor vehicle and, in parallel fashion to the medi-
cal negligence cases, involved either one defendant, two defen-
dants, or a business corporation.
B. Rationale
The research strategy was to vary two factors most central to
the deep pockets hypothesis while keeping all of the other vari-
ables constant. The first factor was the cause of the accident. For
approximately half of the subjects, the injury was caused by medi-
cal negligence, and the defendants were health care providers. For
the remaining jurors, the injury was described as caused by an
automobile accident. An auto injury was chosen as the comparison
case since most critics have used it as the baseline against which
malpractice cases are judged."°
The second factor was the number or type of defendants. We
hypothesized that one crucial distinction between automobile injury
cases and medical malpractice cases was that the former frequently
have a single defendant, whereas the latter typically have multiple
defendants. As I will discuss in more detail below, a new, although
still not well understood, body of research evidence suggests that
juries may assess responsibility and damages differently for corpo-
104. See supra Part I.
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rate acts than for acts by single individuals. 5 Consequently, of
the jurors who were told that medical negligence caused the inju-
ry, some had a version in which the negligence was ascribed to a
single physician, some had a version with two physicians, and some
had a version in which the hospital was the defendant. Jurors who
received the auto accident version of the case had parallel con-
ditions of one defendant, two defendants, or a business corpora-
tion.
Thus, the study can be described as a 2x3 factorial experi-
ment, yielding six conditions: a malpractice case involving three
types of defendants and a motor vehicle case involving three types
of defendants. To control for differences in liability, the case mate-
rials presented to the jurors asserted that the defendant had been
found legally negligent and that the jurors' only task was to assess
the amount of damages.
Most of the concern with the deep pockets effect and other
factors relating to juror damage awards centers on the non-eco-
nomic components of damages, particularly pain and suffering. The
apparent assumption is that assessment of this component is so
subjective that any juror biases can find free expression. For in-
stance, Weiler stated that "the most troublesome feature of large
tort verdicts is the amount of damages awarded for pain and suf-
fering, not for direct medical costs."'" As a consequence, we de-
signed the case materials so that the defendant(s) stipulated medi-
cal expenses; the jurors were asked only to determine the amount
of damages for pain and suffering.
As discussed earlier, assertions about the deep pockets effect
are usually accompanied by speculation about the psychological
attitudes of the jurors who produce those awards. Hammitt,
Carroll, and Relles speculated that jurors may balance "the benefit
of greater compensation for the plaintiff against the harm to the
defendant;" that jurors may believe that doctors are heavily in-
sured; and that jurors' sensibilities are insulted by the breach of
special trust a patient places in his doctor.'07 Huber asserted that
the public has come to view accidents as "malign and calculated
intrusions on the settled order of things" with the consequence
that hospitals and surgeons are viewed as thick-skinned, well-in-
105. See infra Section HI(A).
106. WEILER, supra note 3, at 54.
107. Hammitt et al., supra note 31, at 756.
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sured, callous, and unwilling to take measures to prevent acci-
dents."c~ None of these assertions about juror attitudes can be
assessed from jury verdict reporters, but our experiment allowed
us to study juror attitudes on these matters in the context of the
specific case to which they were exposed.
C. Juror Sample and Research Procedure
The sample of jurors consisted of 147 veniremen waiting to be
called for jury selection in the Wake County (Raleigh), North
Carolina state court. They were told that the researchers were
studying juror decisionmaking and were asked to volunteer; they
also were told that participation was not part of their jury service
and that their answers would be anonymous. The sample consisted
of equal numbers of women and men. Their average age was 42,
their average education level was high school graduate with some
post-high school work, and they lived in households with yearly
incomes that averaged $42,800. We did not inquire about race on
the questionnaires, but blacks appeared to participate in numbers
proportionate to their representation in the jury pool. The sample
appears to approximately mirror the demographic characteristics of
the jury pool.
The case materials were randomly ordered so that jurors were
randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions. A
few jurors did not complete the study after volunteering, resulting
in an uneven number of jurors per condition. Although the statisti-
cal tests that we applied to the data take unequal numbers into-
account and weight the data accordingly, the numbers of jurors
per condition are as follows:
Condition Number of Jurors
(1) medical negligence, 1 defendant 21 jurors
(2) medical negligence, 2 defendants 26 jurors
(3) medical negligence, hospital 23 jurors
(4) auto negligence, 1 defendant 25 jurors
(5) auto negligence, 2 defendants 26 jurors
(6) auto negligence, corporate defendant 26 jurors




Each juror was given a packet of materials consisting of back-
ground facts, results of a prior judicial proceeding establishing
defendant liability, excerpts of the plaintiff's testimony about her
pain and suffering, three photographs of the plaintiff demonstrat-
ing the injury, and legal arguments from attorneys for both sides.
Instructions from the judge stipulated economic (medical expenses
and wages) damages of $34,268 and provided standard guidance on
awards for pain and suffering. Following these materials, the jurors
received a verdict sheet, the questionnaire on juror perceptions
and attitudes, and seven questions pertaining to the jurors' demo-
graphic characteristics.
1. Medical Negligence, One Defendant. The plaintiff was
described as a seventeen-year-old female who elected surgery
under general anesthesia to have a benign cyst removed from her
back. She was given a sedative prior to general anesthesia and
brought into the operating room. When the anesthesiologist negli-
gently moved away from the disoriented patient, she fell off the
operating table. She was placed back on the table and the opera-
tion was completed, but when she awoke in the recovery room
with excruciating pain in her leg, doctors discovered that she had a
broken femur. The leg was set in a plaster cast, and the patient
was discharged the next day. However, she required pain medica-
tion for two weeks, and when the cast was removed in two
months, it was discovered that the fracture had not healed proper-
ly, resulting in a two-inch shortening of her leg. The result was
determined not to be the fault of the doctor who set the leg.
During the next six months, the plaintiff was unable to attend
school or participate in normal physical activities and had to un-
dergo four separate corrective surgeries: an osteotomy to lengthen
the leg bone; osteosynthesis to attach a metal plate to the leg;
surgery to remove the metal plate; and plastic surgery to cosmetic-
ally disguise the scars. During part of this time, the evidence (illus-
trated by a photograph) showed that she was on crutches with an
exterior metal plate on her leg. Testimony indicated that she also
underwent intense and painful physical therapy.
The ultimate result was a good one: she recovered fully, and
plastic surgery successfully corrected the surgical scars. However,
she sued the anesthesiologist for medical expenses and her pain
and suffering over the lengthy period of her recovery. The lawyer
[Vol. 43:217
DEEP POCKETS
for the defendant did not dispute liability and conceded the eco-
nomic damages of $34,268, but he argued that the amount for past
pain and suffering should be $30,000. The lawyer for the plaintiff
argued that compensation for pain and suffering should be be-
tween $180,000 and $220,000.09
2. Medical Negligence, Two Defendants. The facts of the
case were identical except that in this instance, the surgeon began
the operation before the patient was fully anesthetized, causing her
to kick and fall off the table. Prior judicial proceedings ascertained
that both doctors were liable because the anesthesiologist is re-
quired to ensure that the patient is anesthetized and the surgeon is
required to check with the anesthesiologist before beginning sur-
gery.
3. Medical Negligence, Hospital Defendant. The facts of this
case were identical except that hospital orderlies negligently
dropped the patient when transferring her from the operating ta-
ble, causing the broken femur.
4. Auto Injury Negligence, One Defendant. In contrast to
the medical negligence conditions, the broken femur resulted from
a driver who negligently caused his vehicle to swerve into an on-
coming lane of traffic, striking the plaintiff's vehicle. All of the
other facts about the plaintiff and her recovery remained identical.
5. Auto Injury Negligence, Two Defendants. In this condi-
tion, two drivers were responsible for the plaintiffs broken leg.
One driver was distracted while talking on his cellular phone, and
the other impatiently attempted to pass him near a curve. The
startled first driver swerved, forcing the second into the path of
the plaintiff's vehicle.
6. Auto Injury Negligence, Corporate Defendant. This ver-
sion was similar to the single driver version, except that the driver
was an employee of the Allied Products Company; under the
109. These figures were derived from comparable injuries listed in the PERSONAL
INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK: CASE EVALUATION MANUAL III L-Z (1993), and would
be within the range of what a plaintiff's attorney might demand in such a case.
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doctrine of respondeat superior, the corporation was held liable for
the accident.
E. Dependent Measures
Regardless of condition, each juror was instructed to award
$34,268 for medical bills and affix a sum for past pain and suffer-
ing under the following instructions:
Damages should include such amount as you find, by the greater
weight of the evidence, is fair compensation for the actual physi-
cal pain and mental suffering which were the immediate and
necessary consequences of the accident. There is no fixed formu-
la for evaluating pain and suffering. You will determine what is
fair compensation by applying logic and common sense to the
evidence.
Following their verdict on damages, jurors were asked to explain
in their own words what factors were important or unimportant in
their decisions and why.
Next, they were asked to respond to thirteen questions, each
accompanied by a ten-point scale. These questions were intended
to assess juror attitudes and perceptions about the plaintiff's suffer-
ing, degrees of legal and moral responsibility for the accident, the
reasonableness of the amounts suggested by the attorneys, the
risks a person assumes in driving a car or undertaking a medical
procedure, and attitudes about litigation."1
110. The thirteen items were as follows:
1. How severe do you think Katherine Link's pain and suffering was in the
months following the accident?;
2. To what extent do you believe that the accident and the medical compli-
cations that followed will have a negative, or bad, effect on the rest of
Katherine's life?;
3. To what extent do you believe that the accident was avoidable?;
4. To what extent do you believe that the plaintiff, Katherine Link, bears
some responsibility for the accident?;
5. To what extent do you believe that the defendant was negligent in
Katherine's accident?;
6. To what extent do you believe that the defendant should be held morally
responsible for the accident?;
7. To what extent do you believe that the defendant should be held legally
responsible for Katherine's accident?;
8. To what extent do you believe the lawyer for the plaintiff was reasonable
or unreasonable in suggesting that Katherine should receive $220,000 for
the accident?;
9. To what extent do you believe that the defense lawyer was reasonable or
unreasonable in suggesting that Katherine should receive $65,268 for the
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Four additional questions ascertained the juror's gender, age,
education, and household income. Three final questions asked
whether the juror or members of his family had ever been injured
by a health care provider, injured in a car accident, or caused an
auto accident in which someone had been injured.
F. Results
1. Awards. The mean (average) pain and suffering award
and the standard deviation, a measure of the variability of
awards,"' for each of the six conditions, plus aggregate statistics,
are presented in Table 1. Consider the aggregate statistics first.
The bottom right-hand figure, $89,908, is the mean award summed
over all conditions. The two figures immediately above it report
the mean awards for all jurors for whom the cause of the accident
was medical negligence ($93,999) and for auto negligence
($87,783). Overall, the mean malpractice award was $6216 more
than the mean auto negligence award. The bottom row of three
figures ($102,506, $75,682, and $94,484) are the mean awards,
summed across the causes of injury for one defendant, two defen-
dants, and hospital/corporation defendants, respectively.
accident?;
10. Some people say that when you drive a car you should assume some of
the risk for any accident that happens. To what extent do you agree or
disagree with this view?;
11. Some people say that if you go to a hospital for surgery you have to as-
sume some of the risk for any medical accident that happens. To what
extent do you agree or disagree with this view?;
12. Some people say that today too many people file lawsuits in hope of
making a fast buck. Do you feel that too many people file lawsuits for
that purpose?;
13. Some people say that today medical doctors and hospitals are sued too
often. To what extent do you agree that they are sued too often?




Means and Standard Deviationsa of "Pain and Suffering"
Awards by Conditionb
One Two Hospital/ Mean
Defendant Defendants Corporation Award
Medical $99,950 $67,709 $114,339 $93,999
Negligence ($60,482), ($43,278)b ($61,243).
Motor $105,063 $83,655 $74,630 $87,783
Vehicle ($69,471)a ($63,546). ($46,923)a
Negligence
Mean $102,506 $75,682 $94,484 $89,908
Award
a. Standard deviations in parentheses.
b. Comparisons between individual conditions: Cells with similar subscripts are
not significantly different from one another.
Before attempting to put any substantive meaning to these
figures, consider the results of a statistical test, called analysis of
variance, that we applied to the data. The purpose of the test was
to ascertain whether these differences were meaningful in a statis-
tical sense or, alternatively, whether they could be ascribed to
chance variation."2 The analysis of variance indicated that nei-
ther the $6216 difference between the medical and auto negligence
causes of the injury nor the difference between the defendant con-
ditions was statistically significant, although there was a "cause by
defendant" interaction effect."' Put in layperson's terms, the test
indicates several things. First, there is no support for the hypoth-
esis that jurors would be prejudiced against medical providers in
comparison to motor vehicle operators or to corporations who are
legally responsible for them. Second, there was no general support
for the hypothesis that the number or type of defendants makes a
112. Id. at 252-373.
113. The F value for the cause factor was 0.29, df=1,138, and probability was not sta-
tistically significant. The F value for number/type of defendants was 2.70, df=2,138, and
probability was not significant. The F value for cause by defendant interaction was 3.06
with df=2,138; the probability was less than .05, a statistically significant result.
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difference, despite the fact that the mean for the two-defendant
conditions ($75,682) appears substantially lower than the means for
the one defendant ($102,506) and corporation conditions ($94,484).
There is support for the hypothesis that the cause of the injury
and number of defendants interact with one another. However,
further statistical analyses114 indicated that this interaction effect
was due solely to the fact that the mean award was lower in the
condition involving two defendants who were medically negligent
($67,709); the award in the two-defendant motor negligence condi-
tion ($83,655) was not statistically different from the other condi-
tions.
These findings may be better understood by first examining
the standard deviations, which are reported in parentheses for each
condition in Table 1. The standard deviation is a statistical mea-
sure of how much awards varied from the average." 5 The table
shows that in each condition, there was considerable variability.
Consider the one-defendant conditions. The standard deviation of
$60,482 in the medical negligence condition indicates that two-
thirds of the awards ranged from $39,468 to $160,432. (i.e., the
mean of $99,950 + $60,482). In the motor vehicle condition, two-
thirds of awards ranged from $35,592 to $174,534. (i.e., $105,063 +
$69,471). With this kind of variability in awards, it is not surprising
that although the mean award in the motor vehicle negligence
condition was $5113 larger than the medical negligence condition,
the difference was probably due to chance fluctuation. The same
reasoning can be applied to comparisons between the other condi-
tions.
Another way to understand these data is to look at the medi-
an awards, which are the midpoint of the award distribution. The
medians are reported in Table 2. These medians of the award dis-
tributions are somewhat lower than the means and reflect the fact
that in each condition a few high awards (i.e., $180,000 to
$220,000) raised the mean. Note that the patterns of medians in
Table 2 is similar to the pattern of means in Table 1. A statistical
test of these alternative summary statistics yielded a result similar
114. These analyses compared the individual conditions against one another to deter-
mine which, if any, are statistically significant. None of the individual conditions was
significant except for the two-defendant medical negligence condition, which differed from
all other conditions.
115. See MCNEMAR, supra note 111.
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to the means: medical negligence was not treated differently than
motor vehicle negligence with respect to the size of awards. The
number and type of defendants did not produce statistically mean-
ingful results either.
To avoid any misinterpretation, let me repeat the conclusion
to be drawn from these findings about the pain and suffering
awards. The facts that the mean and median awards were actually
slightly larger for single defendants when liability for the injury
was ascribed to automobile as opposed to medical negligence and
that the overall mean award was slightly larger for medical negli-
gence can be ascribed to chance fluctuations in the data. Statistical
tests of the data lend no support for the hypothesis that jurors
would treat medical and automobile negligence cases differently.
TABLE 2
Median "Pain and Suffering" Awards by Condition
One Defendant Two Defendants Hospital/
Corporation
Medical $77,500 $55,000 $100,000
Negligence
Motor Vehicle $80,000 $71,000 $65,000
Negligence
2. Perceptions and Attitudes. Jurors were asked a series of
thirteen questions about their perceptions and attitudes toward the
case. 1 6 These answers were analyzed to determine if there were
any meaningful differences between conditions. There were only a
few statistically significant effects. The malpractice cause of the
accident was seen as more avoidable than the automobile accident
(Question 3).117 There was a small but statistically significant dif-
ference on Question 4, suggesting that the jurors perceived the
plaintiff as bearing more of the responsibility for the accident
when it resulted from motor vehicle negligence.' Mirroring
116. For a list of these questions, see supra note 110.
117. The mean for medical negligence was 9.2 on the 10-point scale and for vehicle
negligence it was 8.0. F value was 731, df=1,141, p< .01.
118. The mean for medical negligence was 1.2 and for vehicle negligence it was 1.5.
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Question 4, the jurors saw both single and multiple defendants as
more negligent when medical negligence caused the injury (Ques-
tion 5).119 Question 11 asked about the degree to which people
assume some of the risk for an accident that happens to them
during surgery; those jurors assigned to the medical negligence
conditions were more inclined to disagree about patient responsi-
bility than in the auto injury conditions.' These effects suggest
that despite the fact that liability was stipulated in the same way
in all conditions, jurors did tend to perceive the plaintiff as less
responsible for the injury when it was ascribed to medical negli-
gence.
121
3. Correlations Among Perceptions, Demographics, and
Awards. We also attempted to ascertain the degree to which the
amounts of individual jurors' awards could be predicted from their
perceptions and attitudes, as measured by the thirteen questions,
and their demographic characteristics. There were positive correla-
tions between the degree to which a juror perceived the plaintiff's
suffering as severe' and the extent to which the juror believed
that it might have a negative effect on the plainitff's life,"z and
between perceived severity and the amount of the award that the
juror gave. Perceptions that the defendant had moral, as opposed
to legal, responsibility also were directly related to the amount
that jurors awarded. 24 It was not surprising that the more jurors
saw the plaintiffs demand as reasonable' and the less they saw
the defendant's offer as reasonable," the greater their award
was. The more that a juror disagreed that patients assume some
F=4.75, df=1,142, p< .05.
119. The means for medical and vehicle negligence were 2.4 and 3.6, respectively.
F=5.56, df=1,143, p< .05.
120. The means for medical and vehicle negligence were 2.4 and 3.7, respectively.
F=7.36, df=1,142, p< .01.
121. The analyses of variance also revealed interactions among three of the questions:
Question 2, the degree to which the injury had a bad effect on the plaintiff; Question 9,
whether the defendant's offer was reasonable; and Question 10, the extent to which a
driver assumes risk in operating a motor vehicle. However, the data did not yield inter-
pretable patterns of data, and the effects were small. They are ignored in the remainder
of this Article.
122. Question 1, r=-29, p<.001.
123. Question 2, r=-A9, p<.001.
124. Question 6, r=.21, p<.01.
125. Question 8, r--.75, p<.001.
126. Question 9, r=.42, p<.001.
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degree of risk for surgery, the greater was the amount of the
award. 27 Finally, the juror's gender, age, and household income
were not related to the size of the award. Those jurors who were
better educated, however, tended to give smaller awards.1"
It is noteworthy that although jurors varied in the extent to
which they endorsed the beliefs that "too many people file law-
suits in the hope of making a fast buck" and that "medical doctors
are sued too often," these litigation attitudes were not related to
the size of awards.
4. Juror Explanations of Their Awards. The jurors also were
asked to comment in their own words about their reasons for
giving the award. The responses were quite varied, but they pro-
vide important insights about jurors' reasoning processes.
Some jurors focused on responsibility. A juror in the single-
physician condition wrote, "I think a 46 year old Dr. should have
the expertise not to make careless mistakes on human life. That
his job is to see that people are helped and treated with care"
(awarded $220,000). Another juror in the same condition stated,
"The doctor had major responsibility for the care and safety of his
patient. Undue stress placed on the patient for an incident not
even related to her original condition warrants such an amount"
(awarded $127,000). A juror in the two-physician condition wrote,
"The doctors allowing her to fall off the operating table is unpar-
donable. She suffered 20 times the pain which her cyst removal
should have caused" (awarded $30,000). Another, also in the con-
dition with two physician defendants, commented, "We depend on
doctors not to be careless. We are leaving our lives in their hands.
Basically, I feel that doctors should not make these kinds of mis-
takes" (awarded $100,000). Still another said, "It is my belief that
in a job situation such as surgery or any medical area that each
step should be double check [sic] to prevent unnecessary or previ-
ous incorrect performance of that job" (awarded $100,000).
The above examples indicate that some jurors did focus on
the role and responsibilities of physicians. However, jurors ex-
pressed parallel attitudes about responsibility in the motor vehicle
negligence conditions: "The man's total carelessness should be
thoroughly punished" (awarded $200,000); "Accident was




avoidable .... Terrible ordeal because of carelessness with his
car" (awarded $165,732); "[The driver] should pay attention to the
highway because you have to drive for yourself and other people
too" (awarded $10,000).
In both the medical and vehicle negligence conditions, some
jurors commented on what they perceived to be the defendant's
acceptance of responsibility: "The doctors' attitudes about accept-
ing responsibility was [sic] important" (awarded $50,000); "The fact
that the hospital accepted responsibility was also important al-
though I thought that the amount they were willing to pay for
pain and suffering was not adequate" (awarded $80,000); "The
willingness of [the negligent corporate vehicle defendant] to accept
responsibility limited amount of 'pain and suffering' award"
(awarded $100,000); "Important: Defendant [motor vehicle negli-
gence] admitted his negligence-honesty" (awarded $30,000);
"Time-it is now 5 years later and the hospital is stalling" (award-
ed $75,000).
These examples indicate that despite the fact that the jurors'
task was defined solely as assessing the amount of damages, their
attitudes about defendant responsibility frequently appeared to
affect their decisions. It is noteworthy, however, that in both the
hospital and the parallel corporate responsibility conditions, there
were many fewer comments about responsibility than in the condi-
tions in which the defendants were individuals. We will return to
this point later.29
The responses commenting on the plaintiff's pain and suffering
showed wide variation. Some jurors made much of the fact that a
17-year-old girl had a very traumatic experience: "[T]ime lost early
[in life] may never be regained" (awarded $50,000); "She trusted
the doctors and now she will always be afraid of hospitals and
doctors" (awarded $100,000); "[eight] months of life taken from
her .... The Dr. was distracted from his job. One second is all it
took to destroy her" (awarded $200,000). Several jurors mused
about future events, contrary to judicial instructions and the evi-
dence that was presented: "[Alluding to potential problems with]
early arthritis or with child bearing" (awarded $150,000); "[T]his
situation could trigger psychological problems later" (awarded
$125,000); "I think events at that age will be carried into adult-
129. See infra Section HII(A).
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hood" (awarded $220,000). Others, however, minimized the trauma
or took the position that sometimes pain must just be borne: "She
had pain and suffering. But these things don't last long and you
can learn how to get around the way you are" (awarded $220,000);
"[She] lost a year. However, it is quite possible to carry on in a
cast-personal experience" (awarded $30,000); "Pain is a part of
life and money will not remove the pain. Mistakes occur daily by
all people no matter what their occupation. We are all human, this
action [mistake by doctors] was not negligence, it was an oversight
(mistake) .... Life goes on" (awarded $30,000); "We all go
through hardships in life .... I do not feel anyone is deserving of
massive amounts for an incident in her life that she has totally re-
covered from except for memory" (awarded $30,000).
Concerns about getting something for nothing and the impacts
of awards on society were also prominent in some jurors' respons-
es: "The legal system has gotten out of hand in its pursuit of
financial rewards due to damages through litigation that apparently
does not apply in this case, but an award should be what is fair
and right for both sides" (awarded $150,000); "I have a hard time
giving enormous amounts of $ to victims even though I acknowl-
edge her -right to receive something" (awarded $50,000); "Acci-
dents happen; no perm[anent] damage. I can't believe in lawsuits
for excessive amounts" (awarded $0); "Personally, I think financial
judgments in general are too high and accordingly went with the
lowest figure mentioned" (awarded $30,000); "I do not think she
should get rich because of this accident, and accidents do happen
and both doctors admitted that it did happen" (awarded $50,000);
"I tried to balance award.., keeping in mind very large awards
may encourage other lawsuits for the sake of potential large set-
tlements" (awarded $75,000).
It is also clear that jurors uniformly commented on the diffi-
culty of putting a price on pain and suffering and used different
methods of calculating the awards."' Some roughly split the dif-
ference between the defendant's and the plaintiff's suggested fig-
ures. One juror doubled what the defendant said was fair, and
another said it should be three times medical expenses. One jujror
said, "[Eight] months of pain and suffering missing out of her teen
years. She should receive no more than what most people make in
a year" (awarded $50,000). A number of jurors assessed pain and
130. For a similar observation, see Greene, supra note 64, at 225.
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suffering on a per month basis, such as $4000 or $5000 and multi-
plied by the eight months that the plaintiff was incapacitated.
Other jurors indicated that they just came up with a figure that
they thought was fair.
Of the 147 jurors, only one mentioned that the ability of the
defendants to pay was a consideration and that juror was in the
two-defendant vehicle negligence condition: "Not knowing the
ability of the defendants to pay an exorbitant amount and consid-
ering an average salary to be $35,000 [per year,] I feel both men
could pay $70,000 together."
These explanations in the jurors' own words show highly var-
ied responses to the case. Some expressed punitiveness and a
desire to blame, but these responses were offset by those of the
majority of jurors, who attempted to come up with what they
thought was a fair award. Further, it appears that punitiveness and
blame was not disproportionately applied to cases of medical negli-
gence; motor vehicle negligence evoked similar responses in jurors.
G. Summary of Findings
This experiment yielded no support for the deep pockets
hypothesis or the psychological dynamics that are posited to be
behind it. Whether medical or automobile negligence caused the
accident made no difference in the amounts of awards. There were
some small differences in juror perceptions consistent with the
view that plaintiff responsibility may be perceived to be less in
medical negligence accidents, although these differences were not
reflected in awards. Jurors' explanations of their reasoning demon-
strated widely varying approaches to whether and under what
conditions awards for pain and suffering were appropriate. 31
131. One interesting finding was that jurors who made strong statements about the ir-
responsibility of the defendant(s) and those who expressed sympathies for the plaintiff
did not necessarily give the highest awards. This lack of correlation between juror reac-
tions and size of awards leads to the hypothesis that even if the juror were inclined to
punish the defendant or give the plaintiff a windfall, the actual amount judged appropri-
ate to accomplish the goal differed. Thus, one juror might deem a $40,000 award big
punishment of the defendant, whereas another juror who does not wish to punish might
consider $100,000 fair compensation for the pain and suffering. Our data do not allow
further exploration of this hypothesis.
255. 19931
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III. FURTHER PERSPECIVES ON THE
DEEP POCKETS PHENOMENON
A. Corporate Responsibility
The claims about jurors' propensities toward deep pockets
defendants have not been confined to medical malpractice cases. It
is alleged that the phenomenon extends to many areas in which
large corporations are defendants." The small but important
body of empirical literature that has recently developed on the
topic of attitudes toward corporations provides additional insights
about the results of the experiment reported in Part II and the
other empirical literature bearing on the deep pockets hypothesis
in medical negligence cases.
Consistent with the conceptual analysis presented in this Arti-
cle, Valerie Hans has argued that the deep pockets hypothesis
posits that if all other factors in the case were the same-that is, if
corporations engaged in the same behavior and caused the same
harm as individuals-jurors would assess larger awards against
corporate defendants than individual defendants.' She has pro-
posed three potential explanations as to why juries treat corporate
defendants differently.Y One, the primary claim of jury critics, is
that juries make their decisions solely on the basis of the
defendant's ability to pay.35 The second is that juror attitudes
about business might be negative or that businesses might be held
to a higher standard of appropriate behavior than individuals. A
third explanation involves structural differences between individuals
and corporations. For example, because corporations are composed
of many individuals, it may be that people perceive them as hav-
ing greater capacity to foresee and control negative events associ-
132. CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 27, at 3; HUBER, supra note 9. For further dis-
cussion, see Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 11, at 1397; Valerie P. Hans & William S.
Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Lit-
igation Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 85, 86 (1992).
133. Valerie Hans, Factors Affecting Lay Judgments of Corporate Wrongdoing, Paper
Presented at Third European Conference of Law and Psychology, Oxford, England, Sept.
19, 1992, at 3 (on file with author).
134. Id. at 4.
135. Id, at 5. This, of course, constitutes the primary claim against medical negligence
juries. See supra Section I(A). Hans also correctly observes that the phenomenon, if it
exists, could as likely be labelled the "empty pockets" phenomenon if jurors
undercompensate when defendants are individuals. Hans, supra note 133, at 5. This possi-




ated with their behavior. 3 6 Hans observes, however, that it may
be more difficult to ascribe responsibility for negative outcomes of
group activity because it is difficult to identify individual
decisionmakers or the process of decisionmaking. Her research
program has attempted to tease out these factors.
In a first study, Valerie Hans and David Ermann varied the
defendant's identity in a personal injury lawsuit involving workers
who were harmed by toxic waste but kept every other aspect of
the case the same. 37 Half of the simulating jurors in the experi-
ment learned that Mr. Jones had hired the workers, and the other
half learned that the Jones Corporation had done so. The jurors
tended to hold the corporate defendant more morally and legally
responsible for the injuries, saw it as more reckless and blamewor-
thy, and awarded significantly higher levels of compensation
against it.' Further analyses, however, indicated that the
amount of the award was more strongly related to perceptions of
the corporation's recklessness, not its perceived financial re-
sources.139 In short, the larger awards in the corporation condi-
tion appeared to be tied more to the fact that corporations were
held to higher standards of behavior than to their perceived finan-
cial resources.
In a second study, Valerie Hans and William Lofquist inter-
viewed 141 jurors who had recently decided actual cases involving
corporate defendants."4 Most of these jurors said that they treat-
ed corporations the same as individuals. They ascribed this behav-
ior to the fact that the lawyers had admonished them in voir dire
and closing statements and that the judge had instructed them to
do so. They further indicated that during deliberations, they re-minded one another of their legal responsibilities to treat the
corporation like they would an individual. Some jurors did indicate
that the fact that the defendant was a corporation made a differ-
ence but suggested that a corporation should be held to higher
standards of responsibility because of the number of persons
available to solve problems and its greater potential to cause harm
136. Conversely, it may be that it is easier to empathize with the plight of individual
defendants. Id. at 6.
137. Valerie P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual
Wrongdoing, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 151, 155-56 (1989).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Hans & Lofquist, supra note 132, at 90.
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to many persons; ability to pay, however, was not a frequently
stated consideration.
In a third study, 450 randomly selected Delaware residents
were asked in a telephone survey to respond to scenarios that
varied the defendant as either a corporation, a non-profit business,
or a for-profit business. 41 Within each of these conditions, the
survey respondents were told either that the defendant had assets
less than $100,000, over $1 million, or were told nothing about
assets. Participants judged for-profit business defendants as more
negligent and reckless than individuals and assessed higher awards
against them. Contrary to the deep pockets hypothesis, however,
awards against defendants did not vary as a function of their fi-
nancial assets. In independent experimental research, Robert
MacCoun also found that whether the defendant was an individual
or corporation affected how people judged cases but the
defendant's wealth did not. 42
B. Responsibility Components of Medical Negligence
The research on judgments of corporate behavior raises an
attributional issue about medical negligence that was given only
passing attention in Part I. Medical providers are in professional
and fiduciary relationships with their patients; the patients place
themselves in the hands of the professionals with trust that the
professionals will not be negligent in performing those services.
Like their apparent response to corporate defendants, jurors may
hold doctors to a higher standard of care. This response could
help explain Chin and Peterson's finding that jurors assessed high-
er awards against both doctors and hospitals when they were de-
fendants in malpractice than when' they were defendants in other
personal injury suits." It is also consistent with the written, com-
ments of some of the jurors who participated in the present exper-
iment 44 and with the other findings that the injury was seen as
more avoidable and the defendants as more negligent in malprac-
141. Hans, supra note 133, at 6.
142. Robert MacCoun, Deep Pockets or Corporate Identity: Understanding the Effects
of Defendant Identity on Civil Jury Verdicts, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of
the Law and Society Association (June 28, 1991) (on file with author).
143. CHI & PETERsoN, supra note 27, at 54.
144. See supra subsection ll(F)(4).
[Vol. 43:217
19931 DEEP POCKETS 259
tice than in motor vehicle cases. 45 One reason why these effects
may not have translated into differences in awards was the fact
that in our experiment, both the medical and motor vehicle negli-
gence cases stipulated defendant liability."4 The corporate re-
sponsibility research indicated that jurors may have a hard time
assessing responsibility for corporate behavior. This finding might
help account for Sloan and Hsieh's finding that jurors assessed
lower awards against hospital defendants than against individual
doctor defendants. 47
145. See supra text accompanying note 65.
146. Research and theory in other contexts indicates that people in positions of au-
thority or who possess special expertise are held more accountable and responsible for
their actions. See V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE (1992);
Stephen M. Rosoff, Physicians as Criminal Defendants: Specialty, Sanctions, and Status
Liability, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 234-35 (1989) (finding that physicians in high-
status areas of medical practice are held more accountable for criminal actions than phy-
sicians in lower-status areas of practice).
As the present Article was being written, the author learned of an unpublished
experiment by Bourgeois and Horowitz that bears directly on the responsibility hypothe-
sis. Martin J. Bourgeois & Irwin Horowitz, Summary of Damage Award Study (study
summary on file with the author and reported with permission of Professor Horowitz). In
the simulation, jurors were instructed to award damages in a wrongful death suit in
which defendant liability had previously been established and pain and suffering was not
at issue because the plaintiff had died instantly. Half of the jurors were told that the
cause of-death was a surgical mishap, and half were told the plaintiff's death was due to
an automobile accident. In each of these two conditions, the defendant was either a
doctor (who committed a surgical error or who drove the automobile that caused the
death) or a hospital that either was liable for the surgical error or that owned the vehi-
cle the physician was driving. The average awards in the four conditions were as follows:
doctor/malpractice = $1,387,600; doctor/automobile = $463,812; hospital/malpractice =
$1,640,062; hospital/automobile = $1,309,267. The results may lend partial support for the
deep pockets hypothesis in that the hospital defendant paid almost three times more than
the physician defendant in the automobile negligence condition, although an alternative
interpretation is that the jurors discounted the award for the physician automobile negli-
gence defendant rather than increased it for the hospital. See Hans & Lofquist, supra
note 132, at 102-04 (using similar reasoning). For our purposes, however, the more in-
teresting finding is the comparison of jurors' assessments of responsibility in the doc-
tor/malpractice and in the doctor/auto negligence conditions. Although the award was
greater when the doctor caused the death through malpractice, rather than through negli-
gent driving, the jurors also ascribed significantly greater responsibility to the doctor in
the former condition than in the latter. This result is consistent with the responsibility
findings in our own experiment, with our analyses of differences in contributory negli-
gence between malpractice and auto negligence cases, see supra Section II(F), and with
Hans's analysis, see Hans, supra note 133.
147. Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 84, at 1024. Obviously, in light of the methodological
problems in verdict and closed-claim data already discussed, we must consider other pos-
sibilities as well, e.g., different types of evidence, different theories of liability, and differ-
ing abilities of plaintiffs' and defense attorneys. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
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These hypotheses should be viewed as complementary to the
other selection, structural, and process dimensions that distinguish
malpractice from motor vehicle cases. Also, they should be treated
as descriptive, rather than prescriptive, hypotheses; we leave to
others the question of whether it is appropriate for jurors to hold
physicians to a higher standard.
C. Comparative Perspective on Pain and Suffering
Although our research found no evidence to support the deep
pockets hypothesis, a question may arise about the average award
of $98,908.1" Weiler and others have raised concerns about the
magnitude of pain and suffering awards."' One can ask whether
the awards to the teenage plaintiff were appropriate for an injury
that was only a temporary interlude in her life.
As Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel observed in their classic
research on juries, judgments about the quality of jury decisions
have to be made in comparison to the possible alternatives: for
example, a professional decisionmaker such as a judge or arbitra-
tor. 50 With respect to the issue of damages, some authors assert
that professionals can do a better job than jurors because their
legal training makes them less susceptible to legally irrelevant
emotional factors and because their experience and knowledge
with regard to other cases gives them a more realistic perspective
on the monetary worth of particular cases.'
In contrast to this reasoning, Kevin Clermont and Theodore
Eisenberg found that in a large sample of cases filed in federal
courts, judges gave larger awards than juries.5 2 In an experimen-
tal study, Jeffrey Rice and I found no difference between the
average awards for pain and suffering and disfigurement rendered
148. See supra Table 1.
149. WEILER, supra note 3, at 54-61; AMA PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 9; Bovbjerg et al., supra note 84, at 911-13; Griffith, supra note 14, at 195.
150. HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 9 (1966); Harry Kalven,
Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1063 (1964); see also VALERIE
HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 114-15 (1984).
151. For a review of this literature, see Bovbjerg et al., supra note 84; Vidmar &
Rice, supra note 84, at 884-89.
152. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1126. The authors took note that much
of the difference may be due to the fact that judges and juries get different types of cas-
es. Id. Samuel Gross argues that almost all of the differences in Clermont and
Eisenberg's data can be ascribed to case selection. Samuel R. Gross, Settling For a Judge:
A Comment on Clermont and Eisenberg, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1178 (1992).
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by jurors and senior attorneys, including former trial court judg-
es.13 Furthermore, in direct contradiction of the "professionals
are superior" claim, we found evidence that jurors are likely to
exhibit less variability in their awards than single judges or arbi-
trators.1,4
We obtained data similar to the Vidmar and Rice study to
provide a comparative perspective on the juror awards in the
present experiment. Fifty-six senior North Carolina attorneys, rep-
resenting both plaintiffs and defense bars, were given the same
case materials that the jurors had been provided in four of the six
conditions in the experiment and asked to render an award.'55
Summed over the four conditions, the average award was $100,821.
The comparable figure for jurors in the same four conditions was
$98,594. The difference was not statistically significant. 6 Howev-
er, the. variability of the attorneys, as determined by the standard
deviations of their awards, was more than twice as large as the
variability that I estimate twelve-person juries would exhibit.
5 7
In summary, jurors and legal professionals responding to the same
case facts, on average, rendered essentially the same awards, but it
is likely that juries would produce more reliable estimates of dam-
ages for pain and suffering.
D. Generalizability of the Experimental Research
Invariably, criticisms are raised about the generalizability of
experimental research, particularly when it contradicts widely held
views. Although we studied real jurors, the task was artificial; for
example, the jurors did not deliberate.
The response to this criticism is that when different studies
using different methodologies all point in the same direction, we
153. Vidmar & Rice, supra note 84, at 892-93.
154. Id. at 897. The awards of legal professionals had a standard deviation of $16,730
in contrast to an estimated standard deviation of $10,970 for twelve-person juries.
155. The four conditions were as follows: malpractice case with individual defendant;
malpractice case with hospital defendant; auto negligence case with individual defendant;
auto negligence with corporate defendant. A more detailed account of the attorney data
will be reported in a subsequent article.
. 156. A t test yielded a value of 0.25, with 149 degrees of freedom; this difference is
not statistically significant.
157. The standard deviation for the experienced attorneys was $46,452, and that for




gain confidence about the generalizability of the experimental re-
sults. The present experiment seems generally consistent with the
research on corporate responsibility. The data also are congruent
with the findings from jury verdict statistics that contradict the
deep pockets hypothesis. The explanations jurors gave in our ex-
periments are similar in many respects to those the jurors who had
decided real cases in the Hans and Lofquist study offered... and
with interviews obtained from jurors who decided real malpractice
and motor vehicle negligence cases in North Carolina.' s9 North
Carolina jurors who made awards against doctors indicated that
they were worried about the doctor's ability to pay and the effect
on the doctor and his practice but, following the judge's instruc-
tions, attempted to set their concerns aside and decide the case on
the merits."6 Conversely, jurors who rendered a $205,000 award
against a tow truck operator and his employer in a wrongful death
trial arising out of motor vehicle negligence explained afterward
that they worried about the financial impact on the defendants.
They ultimately concluded that if the defendants did not have
liability insurance, it was their own misfortune because the concern
should be with fairly compensating the heirs to the estate, as the
judge had instructed them to do. 61 In short, the findings of the
present study have substantial plausibility.
IV. CONCLUSION
A careful analysis of the research findings on which propo-
nents of the deep pockets hypothesis in medical negligence cases
have relied is methodologically flawed beyond redemption-the
findings do not justify a conclusion that there is a deep pockets
effect. Our experimental research, which controlled for alternative
hypotheses, yields no support for the deep pockets effect and is
corroborated by other research findings.
Unfortunately, we still do not have a clear understanding of
precisely how jurors respond to medical negligence cases, particu-
158. Hans & Lofquist, supra note 132.
159. See Vidmar, supra note 4; see also Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey Rice, Jury-Determined
Settlements and Summary Jury Trials: Observations About Alternative Dispute Resolution
in an Adversary Culture, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 89 (1991). Reports of these interviews
are on file with the author.
160. See Vidmar, supra note 4, at 120.
161. For a synopsis of this case, see Vidmar & Rice, supra note 159, at 100 n.51.
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larly, how judgments of liability influence damage awards. We also
do not have reliable, data on what percentage of jury awards can
be ascribed to non-economic damages, but it is clear that the
widely reported claim that they average up to fifty percent or
more of total awards 62 is without foundation.
It is intriguing to question why belief in the deep pockets
effect and the excessiveness of non-economic damages are so wide-
spread and why many authors and policymakers have failed to
recognize the flimsy or contrary evidence documented in this Arti-
cle. Let me offer some hypotheses that bear on the answer to
these questions. First, the deep pockets hypothesis could be ex-
plaining real phenomena that persons intimate with the legal sys-
tem-e.g., judges, defense lawyers-have apprehended; the meth-
odological shortcomings of prior studies have just failed to un-
equivocally demonstrate their existence. This remains a viable
explanation, except that the present experiment and other data de-
scribed in this Article appear to contradict it. Second, although the
deep pockets effect may not exist in malpractice cases, it may
occur in other types of cases, such as products liability. There is
only a small amount of evidence to support the deep pockets
effect in any context, 63 but even if it does exist, generalizations
may be improperly made to malpractice cases. A third explanation
is that belief in the deep pockets effect is consistent with intu-
itive-but incorrect-assumptions about how jurors behave. From
its modem inception as a factfinder in seventeenth-century Eng-
land to the present day, the jury has had its critics. Some legal
professionals have questioned how a group of laypersons can make
intelligent and unbiased judgments in tasks to which professionals
devote years of education and their entire careers) 64 At the
same time, doctors and their professional organizations have ques-
tioned whether any group of persons other than physicians can
make judgments about medical negligence because of the difficult
and complex technical medical questions that they allege are in-
volved in malpractice disputes.'6 For any legal or medical pro-
162. See supra notes 15-21.
163. See Hans & Lofquist, supra note 132, at 106-07; Hans, supra note 133, at 5, 11.
164. See generally HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 150, at 113-16; Johnson et al., supra
note 5, at 1371 ("Even under the best of circumstances, juries can never be as effective
as specialized triers of fact at deciding malpractice cases . ); Landsman, supra note
25.
165. See AMA PROPOSED ALTERNATwE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7-8; Johnson et
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fessional holding such views, there is no reason to closely examine
statistics that "confirm" things that ."everybody already knows
anyway." A fourth explanation is that the methodological and
other data limitations of the empirical studies that I have identi-
fied inthis Article are not obvious ones that laypersons can identi-
fy. I include lawyers and doctors in the definition of laypersons;
most have not been trained in analysis of the types of data sets or
statistical techniques used in the verdict outcome studies that I
have critiqued in this Article.
It is not so clear to me, however, why the social scientists
who conducted the studies have ignored such major methodologi-
cal shortcomings, since many of the problems are common to
social science research, are well-known, and have been extensively
discussed in the academic literature." I can suggest three factors
that may have contributed to the problem. The first can be la-
belled, awkwardly, the "seduction of large data sets." Although
some authors appear to have been unaware of the methodological
problems of looking only at verdicts, others have acknowledged
some of them, particularly the selection problem, but have subse-
quently ignored or minimized them when drawing substantive con-
clusions. Verdict report data chronicle real jury decisions and
involve hundreds or thousands of cases that on their face, promise
to tell judges, policymakers, and social scientists about the role of
juries in the legal system. They also entail substantial financial
investment to code and analyze. In this context, it is perhaps not
surprising that researchers would be inclined to rationalize away
methodological problems and emphasize possible substantive con-
clusions.
Simultaneously, difficulties may also occur from the possibility
that researchers were focused on prior assumptions and the regres-
sion models under which the data were analyzed, rather than on
the potential problems involved in the data sets themselves. Being
trained in econometric and regression analysis, unfortunately, does
not ensure careful attention to the limitations of the databases on
al., supra note 5, at 1370-71.
166. See, e.g., EARL R. BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH (3d ed. 1983);
DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERMEN-
TAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963); THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL,
QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETINGS (1979);
HANS ZEISEL, SAY IT WITH FIGURES (6th ed. 1985).
167. See Vidmar, supra note 48; Section (I)(C).
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which models are tested. Yet, as my critique of some of the stud-
ies has shown, to ignore or underestimate the conceptual and
methodological problems in these data sets is to build on a ques-
tionable foundation.
Another source of the problem derives from the fact that a
number, although not all, of the studies supporting the deep pock-
ets effect were published without going through independent peer
review. Rather, they were published as technical reports, policy pa-
pers, or in law reviews.' The peer review process prevalent in
science and social science journals requires other experts in the
field to undertake independent and usually blind reviews of ar-
ticles to assess methodological and conceptual shortcomings. Peer
review is far from a perfect process, but it does serve to weed out
many inadequate studies or at least to require the author to attend
to methodological problems and unequivocally state any limita-
tions. If it is not apparent from my critique in Part I, I submit
that a number of the empirical studies would likely have failed
peer review.
A final explanation has been explored by Stephen Daniels,
Robert Hayden, Michael Saks, and Kenneth Chesebro.'69 They
have separately documented the fact that powerful interest groups
have exploited and misrepresented findings about jury malfeasance
in order to further agendas of tort reform.70 Because the civil
jury plays a prominent role in the legal system, it has been used
as a symbol of "the litigation crisis."'' Non-representative data,
misleading data, and horrific anecdotes of a jury system out of
control have been presented at legislative hearings and portrayed
168. For example the Danzon study, see Danzon, supra note 15, was part of a policy
report. The Bovbjerg study, see Bovbjerg et al., supra note 39, was published in a law
review with student editors, and such editors infrequently possess sophistication or experi-
ence in data analysis. The Rand Studies, see, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 27; CHIN &
PETERSON, supra note 27; PETERSON & PRIEST, supra note 7, were published by the
Rand Corporation itself. Although it is my understanding that the Rand reports do un-
dergo in-house peer review, the process is not the same as would occur in a social sci-
ence or science journal.
169. See Kenneth Chesebro, Galileo's Retort. Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1637 (1993); Daniels, supra note 28; Robert M. Hayden, Neocontract Polemics
and Unconscionable Scholarship, 24 LAv & Soc'y REv. 863 (1990); Saks, supra note 4.
170. See id.; Hayden, supra note 169; Saks, supra note 4, at 1156-66.
171. Marc Galanter, Jury Shadows: Reflections on the Civil Jury and the "Litigation
Explosion," in THE 1986 CHIEF JusTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY:
THE AMERICAN CIVIL JURY 15 (The Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation
ed., 1987); Galanter, The Civil Jury, supra note 4.
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in stories and advertisements in the mass media. This propaganda
creates and reinforces beliefs about the deep pockets effect not
only in the general public"2 but in the legal, medical, and legis-
lative communities as well. Propagandists have no interest in meth-
odological confounds when the statistics appear consistent with
their goals.
There are, then, multiple and overlapping explanations for the
widespread belief in the deep pockets hypothesis. In fact, the issue
deserves more extensive treatment that I have given it here, but
some mention of it is appropriate in the conclusion of this Article.
Finally, I want to enter the caveat that this Article does not
attempt to address the much broader controversy about medical
negligence and the tort system. 3 However, because the deep
pockets hypothesis and jury behavior in general play such a central
role in claims about the failures of the tort system," * the Article
raises serious problems for critics. More research may modify or
contradict these findings, but in the meantime, we may conclude
that on present evidence, the jury's reputation for reaching into
the perceived deep pockets of health care providers and giving
excessive awards for pain and suffering is not warranted.
172. See, e-g., Hans, supra note 133; Edith Greene et al., Jurors' Attitudes' About Civil
Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 805 (1991).
173. Se eg., WEULER, supra note 3; HEALTH CARE DELIVERY, supra note 60.
174. See, e.g., AMA PROPOSED ALTERNATiVE REPORT, supra note 5; Kenneth S.
Abraham, Medical Liability Reform: A Conceptual Framework, 260 JAMA 68, 70 (1988)
("The chief characteristic of the American jury system that impinges on the medical lia-
bility problem is the use of lay jurors."); Arnold S. Relnan, Changing the Malpractice
Liability System, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 626, 626 (1990) (arguing that measures "to
correct some of the more obvious failings of the tort system ... cannot correct two
fundamentally flawed assumptions on which the system rests-namely, that trial by jury is
the best method of determining whether there has been negligence"); supra notes 1-14
and accompanying text; see also Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and
the Politics of Civil Justice Reformv Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 269; Saks, supra note 4, at 1274-77.
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